This was not dated originally. It was approximately Jan 1, 1950

This begins my attempt tp keep some notes of my own in a form that I can later read. I do no t loike to dictate them, while my penmamship, in spite of my earnest efforts, quickly degenerates into a hopeless scrawl that, within a matter of days, is entirely meaningless to me. So I take advantage of this extraordinary present from thr I. B. M. (Tom Watson) to begin my own training on the typewriter and to kill two birds by practicing on notes that I should like to remember.

a this typewriter

All through the notes that I have made since the war's end runs the strain of annoyance, or irritation, of my seeming inability to draw completely clear of public suspicion that I seek some political office, without baldly and arbitrarily making certain statements that I believe no American has the right to make! Those notes are scattered over periods of months and are characterized chiefly by their irregularity and haphazard composition. They have ordinarily been dashed off in crowded minutes, with little time to insure exactness of expression or even to check on the thought expressed. Nevertheless, I know, without referring to the little black book in which they are to be found, that my statement a s to their reflection of a worrisome ~~political problem for me~~ personal ~~solution~~ problem, is absolutely correct.

To describe accurately the position in which I now find myself will take far more time than I can devote to this laborious business today! However I can make a start and perhaps I can find the opportunity during the coming week to put down the essentials of the situation. Admittedly the doing so promises no return to anybody--least of all me! No, here I think I'm wrong! I believe my effort, if successful will tend to clarify my mind to some degree and thus give me greater confidence that I am not straying from what I believe to be principle in any of my statements, conversations or decisions affecting any part of this confusing problem.

First, the personal angle.

I do not want a political carrer; I do not want to be publicly associated with any political party, although I fervently believe in the two party system and further believe that, normally, a citizen is by no means performing his civic duty unless he participates in all applicable activities of his party, to include participation in precinct caucuses.

Consequently, it seems necessary to give reasons for regarding ~~myself~~ now as an exceptional rather than a normal case.

My basic purpose is to try, however feebly, to return to the country some portion of the debt I owe to her. My family, my brothers and I, areexamples of what this country with its system of individual rights and freedoms, its boundless resources and its opportunities for all who WANT to work, can do so for its citizens, regardless of lack of wealth, political influence or special educational advantage. No where else on earth has this type of material, intellectual and spiritual opportunity been so persistently and so successfully extended to all. Regardless of all faults that can be searched out in the operatiin of the American system, I believe without reservation that in its fundamental purposes and in its basic structure it is so far superior to any government elsewhere established by men, that my greatest possible opportunity for service is to be found in supporting, in renewing public ~~support for~~

respect for, and in encouraging greater thinking about these fundamentals. Since I believe that All Americans, ~~without exception~~ even though they do so unconsciously or sub-consciously, actually support these basic tenets of Americanism, it follows that in the field in which I should wokr, (that is, the bringing of these basic tenets to our CONSCIOUS attention,) there is no difference between the two great parties. Therefore I belong to neither. Their function is to bring before the people the chance to choose between two different methods in the application of the principles to specific problems and to allow the people to choose between two specific slates of candidates. I t seems to me that there are cogent reasondl why I should eschew this partisan field of citizenship effort.

In the first place I shall never lose my direct and intimate interest in the legitimate aspirations and the welfare of our veterans of World War II. They, I hope, have confidence that I shall try to dischaege toward them every obvious obligation---and they comprise BOTH Democrats and Republicans. Whatever name or reputation I have, they made for me --I cannot conceive of their believing that I was showing proper appreciation of this fact if I should join a political party. (At least I am sure that those of the opposite party would look at me with a jaundiced eye.)

In the secind place ~~xx~~ I have been a soldier--necessarily without political affiliation--all my life. I should like to be of some help from time to time in that type of governmental problen for which I have been educated. That classificatiin is military. If my counsel is ever desired in that kind of question, I should like to be available no matter what political party might happen to be in power at the moment. In other words, I should like to remain just what I've always been, a military officer instantly responsive to civil governmwnt, regardless of its political complexion.

In the third place I accecpted, after long urgung, the Presidenvy of Columbia in the belief that in this post and with the help of these great facultie I could do more than anywhere else to further the cause ~~xxxxxxxx~~ to which I am devoted, the reawakening of intense interest in the basis of the American system. Having assumed the responsibilities of this post I do not beliebe it appropriste for me to ~~publicly~~ proclain a loyalty to a particular political party. We have here men and women of all parties, — our alumni and supporters, upon whom we are dependent for our existence, likewise come from all parties. My joining a specific prty would certainly antagonize some. In my conviction, even partial adherence to a specific party or any partial entry in to the political field would demend from me an instant resignation from Columbia. But here is the place I THINK I can do the most good for all--- even if that most is a rather pitiful amount.

(in Columbia)

I believe that the Army of the United States is this country"s most devoted, most efficient and best informed body of its size now existing. The Army upholds the Constitution, our basic governmental document and the foundation of the system that places the civil power of government in the master's position over the military. The good Army officer has always been particularly careful to remain loyal to this concept- both in deed and thought and, beyond this, in appearance!!! Many people regard a soldier's entry inyo politics as an effort to overturn this concept. Such a thought springs from prejudice and woeful ignorance- but it is idle to claim it dles not exist. Consequently many individuals in the army would fear that my entry in to the political field was showing a disregard of the possible consequences ti the army's reputation--they might even feel that I was "letting the Army down". This, by itself, might be of only minor consequence. But the possibility of false interpretation on the part of the public ----inspired by political partisans to whom no dirty trick is unknown---- could be very serious to the welfare of the Army, which, I repeat is the finest organization in government--any government.

There is an angle to this same subject that is important, though little noticed. It is the danger--once we become accustomed to thinking of our military leaders as potential political leaders, that their selection (which is done by the party in power at the time of selection) will certaunly be based as much upon political considerations as upon their demonstrated military capacity. Such a grave occurrence in time of war could defeat the nation. That this line of reasoning is not baseless is demondtaated by the history of France throughout the 19th and early 2oth centuries.

As between the so-called concept of the welfare state and the operation of a syxtem of competitive enterprise there is no doublt where I stand. I an not on any fence. In the same way I am not on any fence with respect to my attitude toward a possible nomination to political office. I want none of it and believe that to change ny attitude would be bad both for me and for what I HOPE I can do in the line of public service. But people will believe me when I say that I'm against the handout state but nevertheless a militant liberal. They will not believe me when I say I an not interested in a political office--even the presidency. We are just NOT capable, in this country, of conceiving of a man who does not want to be president. Too many men runni ng for political office have said just that, so the response is, "OH YEAH ! " Well, the obvious course is to say nothing and to continue to preach what I believe, regardless of criticism by the columnists.

Many men have appeared at my office or at my home to volunteer their services if and when I decide I have responsibilities in the political field.

Averell H.
Russell Sprague
Binnewell
Sam Pryor - Connecticut - Panam.
Arthur Gardner - 2211 30th St, N.W. Washington
(Decatur 8 46-5)
[an associate of mine in World War I]
Dave Calhoun - St. Louis.
Bill Robinson
Pete Jones - in special way.
Ed Clark -
Jimmy Byrnes -
Mrs. Luce
Dozens whose names appear in compendium file.
Lucius Clay
Russ Forgan
Wes McAfee (Prov. Union Elec.)
Eberstadt
Hoover } in house of former.

The last thing that an office-seeker seems to think of is just plain honesty. If he can be devious he thinks he is smart; he'd rather be evasive than direct. He wants to give pat answers — he will never for a second admit that the true course, necessarily, is a middle one — between extremes. He hasn't the guts to be "middle of the road". He's afraid of attacks & "me too" from both sides.

My speech in St. Louis on Sept 3. to Lawyers went on this point.

In the back of this book are two memos, written by my two best friends in New York. Neither is a polotician- one is a banked, the other a newspaperman. They take opposite sides in arguing the question"Should Gen. E. now associate himself definitely wkth the Republican party and participate in the ensuing struggles between the two parties-specifically in the Congressional elections of the coming fall?" Why they happened to decide to write and give me their thoughts on this question, I do not know. But I am keeping them because each summarizes, fairly accurately, the arguments brought to me by many others-- some on one side, some on another. Eberstadt, Byrnes, Deweey, Hoover, Sprague, Brownell among the more widely known politicians, and dozens of people on the business and industrial side, have talked to me on the same subjest--but the answer remains the same.

Today the New York Sun ceases to exist as a separate paper. It has been bought up by the Scripps-Howard Chain. The one point that makes the incident of some significance is the explanation given by the ex-publisher of the Sun for its demise. His printed statement is pasted on this page----particularly because of his contention tjat labor leaders have become so unreasonable in their demands that they are defeating their own ends, i.e., by forcing small industry into bankruptcy they are creating conditions in wyich the workingman cannot fail to suffer.

Thomas W. Dewart

With profound regret we announce to our readers and staff that with today's editions The New York Sun will cease to exist as a separate journalistic force. Its name and good-will have been sold to The New York World-Telegram, a Scripps-Howard newspaper. We of The Sun urge our readers to give to the new "World-Telegram and The Sun" the same loyal support which they and their predecessors for generations have given to us. It is the hope and desire of everybody concerned that this association will give to America's largest city the best and strongest afternoon newspaper in the United States.

Mounting costs of production, unaccompanied by commensurate increases in advertising revenues, have made some such course inevitable. Chief among the rising costs have been those of labor and newsprint. Our working force is almost wholly organized and our relations with the workers have always been friendly and cordial. But the simple truth is that union demands have become too great for us to meet in the face of serious losses in income. In this time of rising costs we are compelled to protect the interest of our bondholders, most of whom are our employes. The fact is, and we say it without bitterness or recrimination, that the demands of the unions have wrought here in New York—what they are working elsewhere throughout the nation—an unprecedented and increasing number of casualties among newspapers which once were great and strong.

Despite continued warnings of the economic consequences, various unions have forced, and are continuing to force, higher wages, until, in the newspaper business as a whole, these have risen beyond reason. In the ten-year period from 1939 to and including 1949, the average advance in individual pay of The Sun's employes was 80.1 per cent. In the same period, the price of newsprint rose from $48 a ton to $100 a ton. Prices of all other supplies increased in corresponding ratios.

Recently advertising revenues of The Sun and The World-Telegram have not kept pace with mounting production costs. Both papers have long appealed to a literate and intelligent public. Between them they have divided approximately 650,000 circulation —enough to assure the economic stability of one newspaper, but not enough for two in this metropolitan area.

The World-Telegram is a member of a nation-wide newspaper organization. Its management naturally desired to strengthen its position in the nation's greatest city. Accordingly, it made an offer for the name and good-will of The Sun, which has been accepted with great regret. The sale was completed last night.

Thus it becomes our sad duty to announce the end of the great journalistic venture which began with the first issue of The Sun on Sept. 3, 1833.

Without undue immodesty it may be said that in its more than 116 years The Sun achieved world-wide fame. Its roster of brilliant writers has never been excelled. Throughout its career it has supported constitutional government, sound money, reasonable protection for American industry, economy in public expenditures, preservation of the rights and responsibilities of the several states, free enterprise, good citizenship, equality before the law, and has upheld all the finer American traditions. It has opposed indecency and rascality, public and private. It has fought Populism, Socialism, Communism, governmental extravagance, the encroachments of bureaucracy and that form of governmental paternalism which eats into the narrow of private initiative and industry. With respect to all these things, we may proudly and truthfully say that we have fought a good fight and held unwervingly to the true faith.

Our deepest appreciation goes to the men and women whose ability and loyalty have made the paper a great power, not only in this city, but throughout the nation. We extend to our readers and loyal advertisers our heartfelt thanks and assurance that in the "World-Telegram and The Sun" they will find the characteristics which they have liked best in The Sun.

To the "World-Telegram and The Sun" we extend our best wishes and our heartiest goodwill.

Anotherimportatnt reason for noting here the passing of The Sun is found in that paragraph of hte final editoriad of explanation that states what the paper stood for during its existence. These are the things in which I believe. If a paper that has preached these things cannot secure enough support to operate successfully, the question is, "Are these principles, as guides to American action, now to go into the discard. If they are I am wasting a lot of energy-- but I'll go down fighting. The cartoon below appeared in the final issue of the SUN.

THE NEW YORK SUN, WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 4, 1950.

STATE OF THE UNION. By Rube Goldberg.



General Snyder and I have decided that it is not podsible for me to remain in New York and at the smae time resist sufficiently the demands upon my time so that I can maintainm a schedule indefinitely. Moreove we have found that whenever I return from a vacation iy is only a matter of a very few weeks until I am showing again the effects of strain, long hours and tension. Reservation of a day or half day each week (aside from Dundays) fails because of my giving way to some insistent demand for a conference, meeting, luncheon or similar chore. So now we are to try something differeny: we are reserving one full week put of each two months, to be completely blacked out of my calendar. Preferably I am to leave the city during the "no work!" week, but if not then I ma to lock the front door of my house. This ought to work..... but only today I have broken into the Maech week to accomodate the meeting of the Boy Scouts National Executive Council. That's the way it goes. (And it is only Feb. 7, 1950.)

— Mar. 22. —

I give up on the typewriter. I've turned over my new electric machine to one of the secretaries. I am too awkward — and too old to learn.

Last week Mamie and I spent five days, with George & Mary Allen, at the Seaview Club of Atlantic City. I've convinced that the only way I can maintain a reasonable average of activity is to go away from this city at least a few times or once every 2 months.

Monday I had Harvey Mudd, Mr. Hewitt, Mr. Dempsey & John Dunning for lunch to see the idea of an Engineering Center.

That evening I spent (5–10) at the Council on Foreign Relations following an hour's meeting of the Board of the Metropolitan Museum.

Tuesday I went out to Newark, to address an alumni meeting. Today I spent the morning in the College — lunch at Faculty Club — at 4.30 I go to a meeting of the Committee to support Medical Education, tonight to some dinner. I believe the name is Sidneys.

A few nights ago I went to a dinner for the Garretts (Ambassador to Ireland) given by Mrs. Garrett's sister —

Duke & Duchess of Windsor also guests. We were out very late.

Tomorrow night I lecture (the) on Peace. The dinner of the money to support a young lecturer on the subject I think I delivered first on!!

Another kind of typewriter'

I am quite sure that some of the nervous tension that the doctor (and others) seem frequently to detect in me (as far as I got)

Apr. 5 - 1950.

Board Trustee meeting tonight.

There is probably no more complicated business in the world than that of picking a new dean within a university. Faculties, including the retiring dean, feel an almost religious fervor in insisting upon acceptance of their particular views. There are as many as there are individuals involved, and every man's opinion is voiced in terms of urgency. — The result is complete confusion & I cannot see why humanities have followed such a custom! But I'll be d — glad when we have a new dean of engineering and the fuss, fury & hysteria die down!!

Some of my Republican connections in Kansas have broadly hinted or openly stated that I should declare my association with them. They know of course that I believe we must have a Republican victory in '52; from this they do a lot of arguing that, in my opinion, fail to cloak very far into the future.

Apr. 27, 1950.

Lately a couple of "Gallup Polls" have put me back into the political gossip columns — although, there never has been a complete cessation of loose talk about me as a presidential possibility!

A few evenings ago Gallup reported seeming me against Pres. Truman. Bad business! but nothing to do about it. Hope the Pres. is too philosophical to take and note of the 60-30 report against him.

Public speaking gets tougher & more of a burden. I can limit, very close, the appearances before big audiences — prepared speeches, etc. But every luncheon & dinner — some, every left appear to be scared only — seems certain to bring around the moment when a host declares — "Sir some Gen. E. will be kind enough, etc!!!" How I hate it! Sometimes I think I'm trapped by my liking for people!

Am going to try my first New York Golf this p.m.

Apr. 19°

Some time ago I listed in these notes the names of men who have been urging me to go into politics. I've tried to put down the names only of those who seem to be in position to cause some ripples of interest — who seem to have convictions of the matter and therefore deserve the courtesy of a hearing. None has changed my mind an iota — probably Mr. Hoover has shaken me more than anyone else — and strangely enough he did not urge me to do anything. He simply talked from the assumption that duty might compel me to do something I could not choose to do.

A man name Simmons from Houston and one named Warner from Ft. Collins, Colo. have recently started embarrassing movements — but I think we've got them stopped. The most standard

document this received on the subject is from Isaac Howard — a most conscientious (sometimes I think humorless) individual, who has an important job with Ford Motor Co. He concludes that I must (a) announce Republican affiliations now; (b) speak, this summer, in favor of outstanding senatorial and congressional candidates (Republican, of course) and (c) thereafter merely await the inevitable nomination.

All this or else I'm failing to do my duty to this nation and, finally, I will come to realize I have so failed — and will die an embittered & disappointed man!!!

All very pretty; but I still don't believe it.

The international situation deteriorates even though we see, occasionally, favorable editorials. I wonder how long the few remaining areas in S.W. Pacific can hold out!!

Our leadership is too intermittent; communism is on the job every minute of every day of the 365. Our V.I.Ps are concerned only when there is a crisis — Iran — Korea — Trieste — Berlin — etc etc.

Go to China, we wrote a white paper to show how right we were!! God, such stupidity. When we liberated these areas of Europe in W.W.II where resistance movements were strong, we learned to be careful to prevent later leaders action by the former guerrillas. (Mac A. and the P.I. did not learn this.) What do our bosses think that the Chinese commies are now going to do? I believe Asia is lost with Japan, P.I., N.E.I. and even Australia consider that. India itself is not safe!

May 2.

Yesterday my mother would have been 88 years old, had she lived.

In a recent issue of "Life" magazine was a most flattering story by Quentin Reynolds. It was written about me and my activities at Columbia. This week another article came out — this time in "Harpers" — which castigated me, on the ground that here the students & faculties hate me — and I return the sentiment with interest.

If I could solve the money problem, the university (x) I would not only regard this as almost an ideal place, but I'd have great opportunity & time for personal study. But it's the nagging money problem that keeps me going always — including nights. And so I get tired out.

(x) I hear we may avoid an operating deficit this year — but at the cost of deferring truly needed maintenance.

Recently I wrote a letter to Mrs. Cecil Hillier, a member of the University staff who is retiring after long service. In her reply she used a sentence, "Columbia has been a more interesting and colorful place since you become its head". The remark is interesting only by way of showing that not all the old-timers resent the effort to bring Columbia and the world into closer, cooperative, effort.

June 30 – Calendar says Friday but it feels like Sat. today.

On Wednesday I went to Washington. First to Walter Reed Hospital, then a number of friends in Pentagon: Hamlin – Collins – Matt Ridgway – Al Gruenther. (Couldn't see Brad – he was sick)

I went in expecting to find them all in a dither of effort – engaged in the positive business of getting the troops, supplies etc that will be needed to settle the Korean mess. They seemed indecisive — which was natural in view of indecisiveness of political statements. I have no business + shd. not the ~~pole~~ basis political decision (to support or not to support S. Korea) [It happens that I believe we should have a dozen Korea wars if we don't take a firm stand – but it was not on that basis that I talked to my friends.] My whole contention was that an appeal to force cannot by its nature, be a positive one. This appeal had been made for S. Korea sake, get ready! It's merely possible under the law to get to going.

Remember, in a fight we (our side) can never be too strong! I urged action in a dozen directions – and left a memo for Brad: we must study every angle to be prepared for whatever may happen – even if it finally comes to the use of A-bomb. (which God forbid!)

July 6

Yesterday I was in Washington. Went before a Senate Sub-Committee in the morning; lunch with the President; visit with Averill Harriman, and, later with Mr. Fulbright, Mr. McCloy, Gen. Norstad and Averill. Saw Louis Johnson for a moment.

1. The Sub-Committee hearing was an American propaganda. Our people assume that the world knows something about us; — our system of govt; our international policies; our economic system, etc. Actually we know very little about others, but they know far less about us, and it is essential in the cold struggle that the world know something about us.

+ good intentions.
latent strength.
respect for rights of others.

Since our opponent has to depend on lies, and we can tell the truth the advantage would seem to be all with us. But the truth must be nailed, banner like, to a staff — and we must do that by ~~convincing~~ ~~telling~~ the world ~~the truth~~ that our announced intention of ~~peace~~ wholly are the truth.

2. Lunch: Both Gen. Marshall and I told the Pres. that his decision of a week ago must be earnestly supported. Speed & strength; both are needed. We encountered good intentions but I'm not so sure that we met full comprehension.

Later, in talking to others named above (except Johnson) was encouraged to believe that he, the Pres. was getting the same advice from his other advisers as he did from J. C. M. and me.

Johnson complacently said "I've given MacArthur all he asked for!" — and I had the impression that man saying "approved" meant, to the Sec., that all was well. Go inquired as to the time element — the same "Pretty good". God, how I hope!

But there seems no disposition to begin serious mobilizing! I think that it is possible that military advisers are too complacent when dealing w/ H.S.T.

Oct. 13

Haven't written in this since going on my summer vacation.

Today Gov. D. called me (I suppose from Albany) saying that if questioned he is going to announce his hope that I would accept a Republican draft in 1952. Then seemed to be no doubt feeling about the matter. I merely said I'd say "No comment"!

On Monday, October 23, I arrived at the Blackstone Hotel in Chicago to find there a message asking me to call the President. I placed the call immediately and was informed by the President that he should like to have me come to Washington for a conversation, to talk in general terms about an assignment for me involving a command of the Atlantic Pact Defensive Forces. He stated that if I would get in touch with him upon coming to Washington (where I am now) on the weekend of the 28th, he wished that I make some arrangements for a meeting and that, this would be completely satisfactory. so far as he was concerned,

I was scheduled for a press conference in Chicago and while nothing was suggested by any of the press representatives at that conference which would betray any knowledge on their part of the President's telephone call, I was confronted immediately after the conference by a question from Earl Wilson indicating an accurate knowledge of the incident. I requested that he make no mention of his knowledge because of the embarrassment I would experience during the ensuing week. This he agreed to do, but it appears that some little knowledge did leak out and I was intermittently questioned by other press representatives in the cities I visited - St. Louis, Indianapolis, Cincinnati, Charleston, West Virginia.

I arrived in Washington by a military plane about midnight on Friday, the 27th.

This morning, the 28th, I visited General Collins, Secretary of the Army Pace, and the President; also had a talk with General Gruenther.

The situation seems to be about as follows: The American Chiefs of Staff are convinced that the Commander-in-Chief for the Atlantic Pact Forces should be named immediately. Originally, it was apparently the conception that the Commander should not be named until there were actually large forces to command; that during the formative period a Chief of Staff, heading a large planning, logistic and administrative group, could do the work. The opinion finally prevailed that if a commander's prestige was going to do any good in this problem, it would be best used during the most critical period of all, namely, while we are trying to get each of the nations involved to put forth maximum effort in producing, training and maintaining defensive forces.

It now appears that all of the Chief of Staffs group of the Atlantic union (the group of which General Bradley is Chairman) have concurred in this conclusion and I am informed that they unanimously desire that the Commander should be an American and specifically myself.

From the moment that this possibility was first mentioned, many months ago, I have steadfastly stood by one statement. This statement is that I am a soldier and am ready to respond to whatever orders my superiors in the defense forces and the President, as Commander-in-Chief, may care to issue to me. The President is particularly anxious that the matter be not placed upon a cut and dried "order and obey" basis. He apparently wants to be able to announce that if I should take such an assignment, that I am responding to a "request."

There is, however, one major obstacle at this moment to completing the details which would make the assignment effective and public. This is the fact that there are a number of controversial subjects lying in front of the Council of Defense Ministers, and it appears to be the desire of the American and British staffs to handle all of these questions as a bundle - they do not want to agree merely to those points in which other nations offer no objection, and by doing so leave unsolved those parts of the plan to which other nations may object. (x)

Specifically, the most controversial subject of all appears to be that of rearming Western Germany. America and Britain want to proceed with a partial rearmament, and thus throw the Germans into the whole defensive structure. The French have objected to any consideration whatsoever of such a scheme, although later it appears that they have advanced a theory involving a complicated form of partial German rearmament and hodgepodge organization that they feel might be approved by popular French opinion.

In this general argument I appreciate the French position and sympathize with it. However, I am definitely of the opinion that the French leaders should realize that the safety of Western Europe demands German participation on a vigorous scale and should get busy on the job of educating public opinion in France to accept this proposition, subject, of course, to clear evidence that the Germans cannot regain a position from which they could threaten the safety and security of France. Because of this belief, I am of the further opinion that the Americans and British are correct in refusing to agree to a plan that would necessarily remain largely a paper one and would give more opportunity for debate than for action. They should hold out for a sensible solution for this vital problem before agreeing to accept, on behalf of America, responsibility for command.

I scarcely expect to see this situation clearly and unequivocally resolved. Rather, I suspect that the French may make certain promises and engagements that will at least partically justify a favorable decision on the part of the Americans and British, and that possibly the command will be set up with very great areas of indecision and doubt with respect to the Western German question. If nothing at all is done in the way of resolving these difficulties and I am still asked to command, I would have very great doubts as to the wisdom of my consenting to accept the position. It might be better to make an issue of the matter, even though my own attitude might be very seriously misunderstood in this country or abroad. If, however, there is developed any chance whatsoever that this vital point can be settled logically, as before indicated, it seems to me that I have no choice in the matter whatsoever.

(x) In late February (1951), Jack Slessor (C/S, Air, Britain) came to my office in Paris. He said this idea belonged to American C/Ss only; that British were confronted with a package - which they did not like!

As of this moment, I would estimate that the chances are about nine out of ten that I will be back in uniform in a short time.

All this will occasion a very great deal of adjustment in my personal life. Mamie's heart condition deteriorates a bit year by year and I hate to contemplate the extra burden thrown upon her by attempting to set up housekeeping in Europe, particularly when she would also be worried about the condition of her father and mother back in Denver. Actually this phase of the whole business would be the only one that would give me any great private concern. As for myself, I do not think it is particularly important where I am working as long as I feel I am doing the best I can in what I definitely believe to be a world crisis. It will, of course, be a wrench to give up the work I am so earnestly working on at Columbia, but there are some fine young men there that can carry on and I am sure that my friends all over the country who have promised to help will not let them down merely because I have to go away temporarily. As to the period of time in which I might be involved in such an affair, I do not see how a hard and fast estimate can be made. I firmly believe that my own maximum possibilities for service - based upon my alleged prestige in Europe - will begin to diminish very soon after the organizational phases of the proposition begin to show results. We must remember that the whole scheme may be one that will have to remain in effect for ten, fifteen or twenty years.(x) Consequently, it seems to me that it would be important for me to throw in at an early date some acceptable and reasonably young commander to take over and carry on the work for a reasonable length of time. While I realize that I might be able to carry on for five or six years, I think it is bad practice to allow such developments to fall into the hands of older men. Particularly, I would not want to see the habit started of assigning successive commanders who had almost reached the end of their usefulness as soldiers.

At this moment, there is no telling when decision on these matters will be reached.

(x) (Feb. 1-51) My own belief is that, in the element of time, the U.S. should establish clear limits and should inform Europe of these estimates. This applies to the length of time we should maintain sizeable American forces in Europe.

Nov. 6.

Today I start on a trip to Chicago, Dallas, Texas A&M, Houston, Oklahoma City, Chicago – Home. I travel in interests of American Assembly, a project on which I've been working almost 2 years, but under various names. It's purpose is explained in a memo I'm attaching to this book. It has appealed mightily to businessmen — and support, both moral & material has been fine. Right now we're working on the money for regional capitals (though I personally never ask for a dollar) and though my efforts to interested groups we've bagged, already, well over one hundred thousand.

(Re-negged)	Roy Cullen	25	← (So far as I know, he has never paid this: March '51)
	Mr. Greaney	25	
	Mr. Olin	25	
	Bob. Lovett	10	Boots Adams of Phillips Oil
	Pete Jones	10	50.
	Malcolm Aldis (Houston)	10	Tom Lockhart 35
	Bob Kleberg	10	

(in thousands) are just a few of the larger contributors. So far encouraged! Phillips Lyons, in direct charge of the project, is a splendid leader!

The Allied Conference adjourned in Washington without reaching a conclusion on the German problem. So far as I'm concerned I shall go ahead on my current tasks and let the future (particularly the military future) take care of itself.

A couple of weeks ago Mr. Dewey announced that if elected Governor of N.Y. this year he would try to get the N.Y. Rep. Delegation to urge me as Rep. Candidate for Pres. in 1952. The storm broke out again — within the past

few days it has subsided publicly — but in private conversation it never dies.

Have urged immediate military service of 2 years duration without pay, for all 18 year olds. Jim Conant is in general agreement. Mambert does not agree, ditto Swett. While sometimes I wonder whether I do not exaggerate in my own mind the seriousness of the world situation, I believe am not certain that some of our office holders are either complacent or too slow to trust the American people with the bad facts of the world situation. Some of them typified that we can buy security; solvency and security can slowly be expended — yet I hear talk of 45 billion a year for several years. Tragic.

In Washington I feel that there is some hysteria — certainly one does not gain a lot of confidence when it is hinted that he will probably have to undertake a very serious & prolonged assignment in Europe in order to preserve American security and can obtain no satisfactory answer to such questions as how many divisions, groups and ships are involved in American planned building programs. Vague generals seem to be no chime or forecast — the answer is "In Europe Eisenhower can solve all the problems!" Sweet — but valuable only as an opiate!! Goddamit — is there no desire to know where we are going. If Forrestal had only had the courage to express his honesty and sense!! And poor H.S.T. — a fine man who, in the middle of a stormy lake, knows nothing of swimming. Yet

a lot of drowning people are forced to look to him as a life guard. If his wisdom could only equal his good intent!!

Marshall - the best ~~[illegible]~~ public servant of the lot obviously wants to quit. (I don't blame him - he has no children.)

Dec. 5, 1950.

My evening schedule for this date is typical of my current life. I receive to 3 dinners, all of which I thought I should accept and (as it ~~turns~~ turns out after enough talking between my A.D.C. & prospective hosts) I am going to all 3. By arrangement I go to the 1st for "cocktails," the second to chat a while and finally make the 3d, supposedly, just as the party is to go to the dinner table. What a mess! The first is for Engineering Smoker, the 2nd a veteran organization honoring my old friend Omar Carter and the 3d, (the one I personally accepted a long time back) a dinner honoring my friend Dave Calhoun. Both Omar and Dave have been active in helping the A.A. —

The Korean situation is tragic, although I still believe that MacA can straighten the situation up to some point far enough to stabilize the hostile lines & force their communications to incessant air attack.

What hell we have been doing here in the ZofI for 5 mos.?? Something is terribly wrong — I feel that my hunch of last July I was right — but I was wrong when I supposed that both the Dif. Dpts & the White House would heed the free advice I gave on preparation.

Dec. 16.

Six half way to Europe.

Am just today now had a talk with Ferd. Eberstadt at Herbert ~~that~~ Home. The letter they is "arm to the teeth & stay home"

Talked a long time with Averell Harriman. Whole idea was a long range policy in foreign affairs. Ask Z memos in back of book.

Feb. 1951

Many months ago I decided to transfer to this book (instead of my little black one) the notes I occasionally make upon current happenings. I forgot the reason I excepted that a faint hope of using a typewriter in a loose-leaf book. I gave that up – but will now try to detail occasionally.

2 Mar. 51

I have now been in Paris for about ten days occupying a temporary headquarters in the Astoria Hotel. The problems to date have centered far more on the annoying and frustrating details that impede the effort to get ready to work rather than any important subject connected with the arming and training of European forces.

Yesterday, I went to see the British Chiefs of Staff. We had lunch at Claridge's and I immediately returned to this City. The general talk was about plans and schemes for organizing for the defense of Western Europe, with one eye on the possibilities of doing something to alleviate the bitterness of British popular reaction to the recent announcement of Fechteler as the Supreme Commander in the North Atlantic. I personally believe we can do something by emphasizing the importance of the Mediterranean area command and announcing some British Naval officer as the commander. (This command would not include control over the American Naval Forces given me for protection of my right flank, nor would it interfere in any way with my scheme of command for the protection of Western Europe.)

Admiral Sherman is coming to see me tomorrow with Admiral Carney. I hope that we shall reach such clear understandings of what we are trying to do, that I can push right ahead in forming up the various sub-sectors of this command, making announcements as to commanders, and thereafter getting on with the real job that we have. General Juin, who I want for command of ground forces in the center, will not return to Paris for some days. I understand that I will have some difficulty with him because he will insist upon taking actual operational control of supporting air forces. But he does not see that such an organization will give both the American and British Air Forces the excuse to hold back on allocation of air units to this command. They will claim that the "ground" viewpoint is manifesting itself and that the air cannot afford to make sizeable allocations in an area where the air "will not be so used as to realize its maximum capabilities."

Of course, all this kind of talk is largely balderdash, but each of the Services has its own little fetishes and prejudices and insists upon living by them. In our own way, we are not completely free of the kind of thing that motivates the ordinary or small-time politician - this is the inability to shake loose from considerations of a short-term self-grandisement or advancement in favor of long-term, eventual good for all of us. (In spite of this statement, I still believe that the uniformed Services produce a higher average of concern for the public good and selfless devotion to sheer duty than do any other professions or industrial or labor organizations.)

x x

Right now, France is without a Government. The one headed by Mr. Plevin has fallen and we do not know when one can be successfully organized to take its place. Britain

is torn apart by savage resentment against the Government for consenting to Fechteler's appointment in the Atlantic. The source of this, of course, is England's traditional concern with the sea and the sea lanes that connect it to all other parts of its Empire. Moreover, national prestige and glory have been damaged. This is the type of thing that should be foreseen by so-called statesmen and political leaders but, instead, they just blunder along and leave the results of their errors for someone else to clean up. Too often, these poor victims are the men in uniform.

I am collecting a most able staff. I am particularly impressed with Schuyler and Anderson, two Americans. In addition, a little personal group I have made up of Gault, McCann, and Carroll are most unusual. De Havilland, a Britisher on the Council of National Representatives, seems likewise to be a very capable person. Among the French officers, I have not formed any real conclusions; but among the Government officials who have just lost their places, I liked Plevin, Schumann, and Moch very much indeed.

On Wednesday (~~March~~ Feb. 28, 1951) Gen. Clay appeared before the Senate Joint Committee and ably and persuasively advocated the wisdom of placing no present limit on American military aid to Europe. He was so much more effective and convincing in his approach than Marshall, Bradley or any of the others that I cannot escape the fervent wish that he were our Sec. Defense. So far as newspaper reports could convey the impression he made upon Senators; it was profound.

Adm Sherman comes to see me today.
Nov. 3 — Saturday.

Some days ago I read a remarkable paper in Soviets, by an admiral ~~Stepl~~ Stevens. I think I'll put it in book of this book because well means exactly what it represents my beliefs exactly. But he states the thing clearly.—

June 25. (Monday)

On Sat. night, the 23d, we received word that Pupsh (John Sheldon Bond, Mamie's father) had died. He has been in precarious health for many years — when I met him in 1915 he had a blood pressure of 240 and weighed that many pounds — but, as always in such case, the finality of death came as a ~~[illegible]~~ shock. Min (Mamie's mother) was visiting us at the time and so I sent her, Mamie, John and Dr. Snyder off to Denver. They left here at midnight Saturday. This morning we rec'd news that the party had arrived safely.

Mr. Bond was a quite unhappy man — his troubles arising out of his own attitude. Never in his life of 80 years had he developed a hobby or any recreational practice of any kind. He never exercised except for a walk "down town". As a consequence he became a "indoors" man — he became introspective, sometimes morose. He had no spiritual connections that absorbed his time — he was a materialist only.

Mr. Polevsky came to see me.

Opposes any thought of dealing with Spain — quite bitter about it.

Insist that for any advantage we could obtain we would lose so many friends as to suffer a net loss. There is a definite chance he is completely right — particularly if our efforts to deal with Spain place another early drain on our scarce items of raw materials. All these erstwhile enemies and near-enemies want the "world" and sometimes they are close to arrogant in saying what they will not give us quid pro quo. Our lesson with Russia from 41-46 ought to be remembered!

March. 13, 1951

Each day we get a cabled summary of news from the U.S. In general our sunny conduct subjects commented only with SHAPE or some military subject — sometimes merely with me as an individual.

One phase of the reports now coming in reminds me that I never seem to catch up with the true intensity of American interest in any and all men who may be considered even remotely, as Presidential possibilities. I thought my coming to Europe would tend to still the gossip about me. Not only am I out of the States — I'm on a uniformed duty! But the nagging, speculation and desperating grows worse.

Today I received a cartoon from Detroit Free Press dated Mar. 5.

Drew Pearson reports Sen. McCarthy is digging up alleged dirt with which to smear me if I run for Pres.

Peyler hints darkly that my character & ability lack something of a scandal & moron.

And so on.

Now — I realize that these earnest people have a full right to their own convictions — and a right to talk about them. But it would seem to be the rule of decency to avoid heaping poisonous criticism on the head of anyone who is doing only one thing — working like a dog just to preserve their right to say whatever they choose. At least they might wait until I by some word or token imply that I want a political career.

Actually my name is more often mentioned in dispatches as a possible President than it is as a slave — with one of the most irksome jobs ever designed by men!

March 17. Ostria

Gen. de Lattre is to be here in a few minutes (at 8.40 a.m.) to see me reference his request for reinforcement for Indo-China. The French have a knotty problem on that one — the campaign out there is a draining sore in their side. Yet if they quit in Indo China fall to Communism, it is easily possible that the entire S.E. Asia & Indonesia would go, soon to be followed by India. That prospect makes the whole problem one of extreme to us all. I'd favor heavy reinforcement to get the thing over at once; but I am convinced that no military victory is possible in that kind of theater. Even if Indo China were completely cleared of Communists, right across the border is China with inexhaustible manpower!! Well we'll see what Gen. de Lattre has to say — but I know he'll want me to make a recommendation to the French govt: this I shall not do. (Unless, of course, asked by the govt itself.)

Day before yesterday we sent in a particularly complete organizational system, including selections for principal command assignments. It promptly appears it should do something to help Eisenhower morale.

Apr. 9.

Today I go to Germany to inspect some troops in each of the Occupation (western) Zones. I shall be gone until a week from today.

The Senate voted to send a division to Europe — if more are needed, it is the "sense of the Senate" that Congress should be consulted.

Curious enough — in spite of the fact that I believe this particular action to be awkward, if not damaging to the cause for which ~~we are~~ we are spending so much — I agree with the basic thought expressed by the Senate. If American public opinion does not support adequate reinforcement of Europe pending the development of adequate European force, and to inspire about development, then it is absurd for the President to send here a single soldier. I've tried to get everybody to see that a union of minds & hearts is the indispensable formula for success — if this union is not established then we must seek some alternative to collective security for the free world. Any alternative promises little more than tragic failure; this, it seems to me is the basic truth that we at home — and Europe especially — must understand, now!!

Yet with all the free world in an uproar because people believe that MacA is trespassing on purely civilian functions — it becomes difficult for any one in uniform (and especially me as the Commander in Europe) to propound this truth unendingly. Every personal enemy and every communist would find some way of making capital out of the circumstance. As far as the personal part is concerned, I don't care one ~~whit~~ whit, but such people would not hesitate at damaging the NATO concept in order to attain their ends.

Had a nice note from Harold Stassen. Recently I exchanged notes & cards with Gov. Dewey (on basis of a columnist report that he & I were deadly enemies.) Bill Benton is coming to see me soon!

Jim Wise came to see me today. Reminded me to write a note to Bill Donovan re Columbia University. This I'll do as soon as possible - maybe I have time before my next engagement.

Apr. 17.

I have just returned from an inspection trip of allied units in Germany. The trip was really more one of a courtesy visit than an inspection — but I did contact some units at their daily training — ceremonies were prohibited.

On Wednesday last, while visiting in the French zone, a reporter told me that MacArthur had been relieved by order of the President from his duties in Japan. I naturally refused to comment — and shall continue to do so.

}

Apr. 23. Had to stop. Since writing above I've been very busy both in the office and travelling. Tomorrow I go to Italy for 2 days, to be followed almost at once by a trip to Holland, Belgium, Norway and Denmark!

Adm Lemonnier (French) has joined us as a Naval Deputy. While the need for such an assistant is not so obvious as in some of the other cases, yet his presence assures that French maritime interests (which are, of course, considerable) will not be neglected by this hq.

He (adm L.) has given me a preliminary menu of his views. They conform almost exactly to the principles I urged upon the interested staffs last January. (Use naval power in planks!!)

It is difficult to assess the mental attitude of Europe. Greenlaw and I had lunch today with French C/S. They seem fatalistic, if not apathetic.

More the same day.

Iran. Numbers of people (today an American Oil man) have been saying that the position of the West — specifically Britain — is deteriorating rapidly in Iran. They say the situation is getting far worse than not valid.

God knows what we'd do without Iranian Oil.

My talks with British friends indicate that that country is alive to the danger, but no one yet has told me the real trouble. My American friend merely said that we'd better get busy and give the Iranians an ultimatum, "or else".

April 27.

Have just completed an inspection trip to combat units in North Italy. Spirit is high in that sector — the morale of the troops I saw was surprisingly good. These units included, however, both alpini and Bersaglieri formations — traditionally elite groupments in the Italian press.

Gen. Marras seems most capable. He is the chairman of their J.C.S. The general in charge of the Air Force is also (to all appearances) a most efficient leader. Gen Castiglioni, who is to be named by Marras to command the ground troops in our "Southern flank" organization, ~~seems~~ seems thoughtful & almost scholarly. I don't know whether he can produce the necessary "punch".

Coppa (Army C/S) is fairly old and I assume will soon retire. He is fat but appears energetic.

The armament of the Italian forces is a bewildering assortment of obsolete and cast-off equipment from several nations — U.S., U.K and Italy. Training ammunition is meager, even though I was told that Italy makes fine ammunition and would be happy to make it's own if the U.S. would let it have the necessary specifications.

I hope we can give Italy a few T 26 tanks, at least. Thus each armored formation could have a tiny core of fairly well armored and armed vehicles. A few Shermans are all they have in anything larger than the T 24 (lt) tank.

In the U.S. the "Great Debate" — which is nothing more than a heterogeneous collection of personal, partisan and private grievances — still rages. For most it has now been simplified (over-simplified I mean) into a Truman – MacArthur struggle. How tragic that, at this critical stage in world history we should be torn apart by human selfishness. We should, by all means, continue to debate seriously the various means and methods open to us for waging effective war against communism. There is much room for constructive discussion and argument — but we have not a minute to waste, nor any right to weaken ourselves — in the wicked business of attempting to satisfy personal ambition.

So far as I know, every senior officer in this dep. would like to be somewhere else. Every man here is serving because of an overpowering sense of duty and of urgency in human affairs. It is too bad that they have to combat daily the pessimism and discouragement born of a realization that in London, Washington and Paris, cynical men either guide our destinies or are fighting bitter battles in the hope of getting an opportunity to guide our destinies.

If ever we needed moral and intellectual integrity — now is that time. I thank God (and I mean it) for the few who still hold the respect of the masses. For my family and for America; the only real possessions of my life; I shall continue to work as effectively and as painstakingly as I have the strength to do. But I desperately wish that there could be more established in places of influence in the free world, new, young & virile leaders devoted only to ~~they~~ their respective countries, to decency and to security.

May 15

Bradley, with a party, is coming to Europe on June 2. Collins & wife will be here before that. Each will stay 2-3 days.

We are having a stream of American visitors. Publicity, indoctrination, propaganda, etc. I give time to all — and am astounded at the lack of knowledge of basic facts on the part of many who are supposed to be educated.

—

Today I intended to get out for exercise, golfing with a lot of war friends & with Mr. Hilton & Joe Binns (Waldorf-Astoria). Rain intervened! Possibly Saturday will be O.K.

Just read an article by Bertrand Russell, philosopher. Very good indeed as a mode or code of living today.

May 30, 1951 (Decoration day in the U.S.)

Another decoration day finds us still adding to the number of graves that will be decorated in future years. Men are stupid!

MacArthur seems to have retired into the Waldorf Towers, from which stronghold he issues statements and occasionally emerges to see a baseball game. The first he does through Whitney — who, I think, is one of the Old Chief's mistakes!

I cannot read blame MacA — I get the impression that he is in a state of "watchful waiting" for what, I wouldn't know — but I do know that in his position I'd be after the boys of Wisconsin, the trout of Wyoming or vacationing on the beach!!! Recently I wrote to him — had a nice reply. While I'm determined to stay aloof from all the current snarling and fighting in the U.S. I'm most of all determined never to get into the "personality" kind of argument. In that respect the military men (especially including MacA) have been exemplary.

Messages reaching me since the MacA fight began are even more insistent than previously that ~~I'm~~ I am going to get involved in 1952 politics. In the back of this book I've placed a couple of samples!

June 4.

Dinner last eve with Paul Hoffman, Henry Ford and Mr. Paul Helms (of California). Paul has just published a book "We can win the Peace". He is determined I'll have to get into politics and he is sad — he knows how I feel about it & agrees with me. I'd like to see him in politics — I'd resign to work for him.

June 5.

Lawrence Whitney (Chicago, ?) and Clare Francis both come to see me today. The same story on the political side. One thing is certain. The average U.S. citizen is confused — if not fearful and afraid. Otherwise there'd be no feeling that I should get into the political field. The feeling is of course not so ~~well~~ widely spread as my informants would have me believe (a human generalization formed from a few incidents) but even its meager existence is disappointing!

June 11 – '51

I am coming to believe that Europe's security problem is never going to be solved satisfactorily until there exists a U.S. of Europe – to include all countries now in NATO, and Germany & (I think) Sweden, Spain, & Yugoslavia, with Greece definitely in if Yugoslavia is. (If necessary, U.K. could be omitted.)

It seems scarcely necessary to enumerate the problems that arise out of or are exaggerated by the division of West Europe into so many sovereign nations.

Primary is that of manpower. Italy very m. Italy has excess population & is pouring in vehicles & planes – many others have none at all! France & Germany (the key powers of the region) are on opposite sides in many problems because of French hatred for the Boche as much as the fear of a restored western Germany. Each nation watches its neighbors to see that the neighbor's contribution to the common security is at least equal to the first nation's ratio — and none is ever so convinced!

As Shape I have no ministries to take over ministerial functions in finance, construction, policing, etc. etc. The weak, unarticulated mechanism that tries to serve as the NATO overhead is futile.

I think that the real and better problems of today would instantly come within the limits of ~~prompt~~ capabilities in solving them if we had this ~~one~~ single govt!

Moreover, I believe inspired leaders could put it across. But everyone is too cautious, too fearful, too lazy and

too ambitious (personally).

So many advantages would flow from such a union that it is a tragedy for the whole human race that it is not done at once.

American help — which could then be radically reduced both in amount and duration — would finally render such an organization immune to attack! With this one problem solved — all lesser ones would soon disappear. I could write a volume on the subject.

Local parts would not necessarily be identical. It would be necessary that each adopt & observe a simple "bill of rights". Socialist Sweden could live along side a capitalist Germany, but the elimination of trade barriers & all economic & political restraint on ~~mo~~ free movements

June 14

John & Barbie with David and Ann — and Min — arrived yesterday. Weather, fine!

Mr. Foster of ECA was here today. He paints a sorry picture of Washington — the mere fact of Presidential support almost certain to defeat any bill before Congress. Taft, Wherry, et al (and especially Adam & McCarthy) are disciples of hate — hate and curse anything that belongs to the Administration. Heaven knows there is plenty for which to criticize the Adm legitimately & decently & strongly — but what they are doing is apt to make him an "underdog" and backfire on them! How we need some brains (on both sides) and some selflessness.

There seems to be a bad shortage of machine tools. When we get over this emergency I am going to take as one element of my personal ambitions, that of providing machine tools as part of military preparation until some Ad — administration will take the necessary measures. I've heard the same story time after time and it seems to me we should learn.

Also in stocking raw material! I thought I worked on this one in '46, '47, '48. But when this emergency lets up I'm really going to town!!

July 2 — 1951

Tomorrow I go to London to keep 3 dates — made long before I took this job.

a - Memorial Service at St. Paul's for 28,000 American dead of W W 2 who lost their lives while serving in Britain.

b. Dinner of English speaking Union.

c " with Winston Churchill — Pug Lyons Cunningham — Portal.
(Brookie is out of country).

More & more political stuff these days. I'm saying "nuts" — because they urge me to "get into the fight".

The German problem grows acute. The western allies are not too imaginative in coming forward with ideas that will safeguard west. Europe (allaying fears of Germany) and will at the same time — get Germany wholeheartedly on our side in the struggle against Communism. If I believed in taking time out to "regret" I could write several pages on some of the things Clay and I warned against in late 1948 — and how we were told to mind our own business. Chief of all our worries was that the world would come to be divided East vs West, and that our policies then in vogue would succeed in pushing Germany in the other side — at least in making her ineffective on our side. As of this moment we ought to be showing Germany how definitely her national interest will be served by sticking and working with us!!

10 July 1951

On Sunday morning I was visited by Charlie White, President of Republic Steel. His principal reason for looking me up was to say that he had just completed a close examination into the coal and steel industry in Britain. He is convinced that Britain is again going downhill economically and that the real reason is that they are not producing enough coal. He believes that labor is not performing efficiently and that management is not providing the incentives that will get labor to develop. He feels that since the Government has completely nationalized these industries, political leaders must participate in the problem and get busy, or slow disaster will overtake Britain. He feels that coal production must increase in Britain to the point where that country can again export coal.

This whole conversation was so interesting that I asked Mr. White to meet with representatives from my Headquarters and possibly the ECA Headquarters. To this he enthusiastically agreed, because he thinks that with pressures exerted from the right directions, Britain can save herself.

* * * * *

Mr. White then launched into a description of conditions, present and future, within the United States, as he sees them.

His first hypothesis is that in the next election there must be a Republican victory; that government has fallen so low in the minds of most Americans, that it can exert no leadership and has no prestige. This condition, he believes, influences adversely our position abroad. He thinks that the Republicans have been very stupid and have again and again allowed internal fights and personal struggles for nomination to be the cause of Republican defeat in general elections. He desparately hopes that such a fight may be avoided this time. At this point he brings in a prophecy concerning the business cycle in the United States. He says that in spite of the rearmament program, we are due for a recession, although probably not a full scale depression, in the United States. He is certain that this will occur as the rearmament program tapers off. In support of this he quotes figures concerning the annual output of passenger cars and refrigerators as being far in excess of the annual consumption rate in the United States. He says this observation applies to many other items. (While he gave approximate figures in several items, it seems unnecessary to repeat them here). As a result of this situation, he believes that the man elected President of the United States at this coming election cannot possibly be reelected in 1956. His next argument is that the Republicans must have two acceptable candidates to offer the public, one to win in 1952 and restore "sound business practices" to the United States, and the second to win the election in 1956.

He says that he speaks for no one except himself. He has worked out his plan by himself. This plan is that Mr. Taft should be elected in 1952, that I should support him, and that I should accept the post of Secretary of Defense in the Cabinet. (He apparently does not know that it is against the law for a soldier to fill that particular post and that General Marshall is filling it now only by virtue of a special dispensation from Congress). The scheme would be for Mr. Taft to agree in advance that he would not seek reelection and that I should be promised this by the Republican leaders.

I told Charlie White that, of course, I was flattered that he should think of me in these terms, but so far as I was concerned (a) I now have a job of transcendent importance to the United States. Because it is a military post, I do not find it possible to participate in American partisan politics; (b) that I have always insisted that I would never be connected in any way with politics - even after I could finally lay aside my uniform, except in such exceptional circumstances where a duty was clearly indicated. In this case, I do not see any call to duty.

Mr. White left after repeating that the idea was solely his and not to be repeated to anyone else.

Mr. White came back to lunch at my office on Thurs. - July 12. He has become convinced that American business men can do much to wake up European business men to the need for strong leadership in support of the common security. He is going to work at it.

July 13 -51

Mr. Paul Miller of Tarrytown

News papers think Lee soon has to say whether he is a Republican or Democrat. I think he agrees now with my contention that a soldier has to keep his mouth shut on such matters.

Aug 6.

Paul Hoffman
John Cowles
Paul Helms (California)
} came to see me.

They recognize that I have an important duty in this post.

They believe that I have (rather, will have) a more important duty; to accept Republican nomination.

They wanted to talk about the business of making it possible (at what they call the "proper" time) for the Republican party to place this duty upon me. They see I assume that the requirements of the military post I now occupy are such that I must keep my mouth closed on all partisan matters. The problem that they discuss at great length is the procedure of shifting from a military post to that of a receptive candidate for the Presidency next spring.

I've told them — as I tell all — that I'll certainly always try to do my duty to the country, when I know what that duty is. As of now I have a duty; I cannot yet even describe the circumstances that would be conclusive ~~with me~~ in convincing me that my duty had changed to that of assuming a role in the political field. But I stick to one thing; if I have to help to prove that I have such a mission then the factor of duty becomes rather slim!!

Sept. 25

For the first time in years I've seen a "political poll" (as usual, conducted by Gallup) that puts me well down the list in the order of preference among Republicans. It is comforting — maybe the pressure will ease up. I hear that the Democrats still rate me high — but that causes me no concern. I could never imagine feeling any compelling duty in connection with a Democratic movement of any kind.

Oct 4.

The temptation grows to issue a short, definite statement saying No (in almost arbitrary language) to all the arguments that seek to convince me that I should accept (if offered) the Republican nomination for the Presidency. Some go so far as to say I should so state publicly, now — others even that I should start seeking and scheming for the nomination. On this last is not — I will never seek any nomination. But as to the first the difficulty arises in the mere attempt to be honest. If I wanted to be P. I'd resign today & start travelling the U.S. about Jan. 1. But the ~~[illegible]~~ personal feeling that I could do a good job would have to be so strong as to make me feel justified in leaving this onerous and strenuous post of duty. That is impossible. The only way I could leave this duty is to believe that a great section of the U.S. wanted me to undertake a higher one. This would be a real draft — something that one agree cannot happen. In this I take real comfort — because it will at least eliminate the necessity of my making any personal decision as to my own suitability. I scarcely mean that — because no one is really suitable; I think I mean that I will never have to decide whether or not I'd make a relatively good P. I. In the meantime I can give my best to this task and hope that my silence will help politicians to consider the relative suitability of those that do want the ~~[illegible]~~ nomination !!

Of course, because of the remote, very remote, possibility that persons may, in spite of my silence, succeed in producing a grass roots draft I have to think now about the subject than ~~to wait~~ merely ~~to~~ in a negative attitude. When people like

Paul Hoffman, Gov. Dewey & Stassen, Ans. Duff, Carlson, Lodge and etc. great friends like Clay, Clark, Roberts etc. etc. and others like Craig (Am. Legion Commander last year) all begin to assert that I have a duty. It is not easy to just say NO. I hear that a petition is circulating in Abilene to get a 90% demand from my home town. I don't know what the whole state would say but I do know that ex-Governor Lawrence (Demo) and ex-Sen. Darby (Rep) both believe I should run. ~~[illegible]~~ No more of this — I'd just have to work along. But I'm greatly concerned about one thing — the degree to which all this might hurt the job of establishing a collective, cooperative security for the free world. So far I can see not effect (the confusing confusion of popularity gave and sympathetic recommendations to my views re the reducing of E.C.A. money) but when I do before commence that the constant newspaper and other speculation is hurting our national effort then I'm going to do something.

My replies (written & verbal) to everyone always includes a para substantially as follows:

"The job I am in requires the support of the vast body of Americans. These Americans have the right to believe that their agent is serving all of them and is not seeking to advance the fortune of any group as compared to another. For me to admit while in this post, or to imply, that a partisan political loyalty would properly be resented by thinking Americans and would be doing a disservice to our country, for it would interfere with accomplishment of the job assigned to me. The successful outcome of this venture is too vital to our national welfare to permit any ~~[illegible]~~ semblance of partisan allegiance by me."

Oct. 5.

Letters from John Cowles & Lucius Clay are pleased politely. I'm amused to note that even good friends finally fall prey to the idea that anyone / Jones wants to be President. Not me!!

Oct. 10

The Nato meeting at Ottawa set up a new committee — appropriately nicknamed the "wise men" because the purpose is to solve the problems that the existing civil machinery has failed to solve! The several nations have promised to provide given amounts of military force on a specified time schedule. This so called "plan" does not contemplate a scale of effort that will meet the "requirements" for the defense of Europe as estimated by a combination of several military bodies. Yet already we've found that these schedules will not be met — the effort is too big, say the politicians if we are to avoid economic collapse. Since economic collapse in Europe would spell defeat of the NATO concept, it would appear we have a case of the immovable object and the irresistible force!

The big factor omitted from this kind of talk is morale. Civilian leaders ~~too~~ talk about the state of morale in a given country as if it were a sort of uncontrollable event or phenomenon like a thunderstorm on a cold winter's day. The soldier looks on morale as one of the great factors (the greatest) in all his problems, but also as one about which he can and must do something.

The "wisemen" must learn this lesson. Materialistic factors are important, but much more is involved here. Each should stand, in his own country, a crusader to explain the purpose of Nato — the protection of a free way of life! The threats to freedom should be identified. The obstacles to providing defense against those threats should be clearly defined. The hopelessness of alternative solutions should be impressed upon us, proven by the facts of the case.

The self interest of each nation in the success of the whole should be demonstrated. On this basis of understanding of fact, on this sense of values we should develop the highest possible head of steam (morale). The job is just that — because — in total assets.

Raw materials,
Men,
Intellectual capacity of people
Productiveness
Scientific skill
Appeal of a cause —

We are immeasurably strong than the Iron Curtain Countries.

I hope the wise men will see this.

Certainly I'm going now to ~~matter~~ try to make them see it. (I'm scheduled for half an hour talk before them.)

Oct. 15.

The authorities in Washington are slowly but necessarily coming to the point where they see some of the truth about America's production program. I begged officials (when they were asking me to come over to this job) to know exactly what we were doing. I suppose they thought I was merely hopeful of dodging what we all know was a thorny assignment — at least they seemed bothered annoyed when I asked whether we were certain we knew the depth of the

responsibilities we were assuming and
forgetting that we could discharge them!
Oh hell — upon we cry, delay, delay,
delay!

Oct 18 – '51

Just back from a trip to the Med. Sea – where I visited the 6th Fleet for 3 days. The more I look at present day armaments, of all kinds including the most advanced (so-called) the more I'm convinced that we should institute a basic study at home to ~~the~~ examine into the economics of Nat'l Security.

On a panel designated for the purpose I'd ask the following to serve:

6 Leading manufacturers, industrialists. (working executives, not figure heads)
6 Bankers.
6 Lawyers.
6 Doctors & public health.
6 Red Cross – and purposes in social service.
6 Labor Leaders.
6 (working) shop superintendents & foremen.
6 Public utility Execs. R.R. – Telephones, etc.
6 Labor Reps from same industries.
6 Experts from scientific services.
6 Government Reps.

(My plan would be to have at least 2 of each group of 6 meeting continuously)

I think we should go clear back to millions of dollars the theory in any possible war of the foreseeable future.

Then let us examine ways & means of inflicting that damage. The most economical & efficient methods should be evolved. We might find out just what we have in the vowed the several kinds of ~~[illegible]~~

tactical orgs. would be most efficient & thus we might begin to get a dim idea of real efficiency in peace time organization. I personally think we are spending certain programs merely because they sound efficient; we are afraid not to do them. yet they are expensive and are driving us along (with a lot of political expenditures) straight towards inflation of an uncontrollable character. wouldn't the monster in the Kremlin rejoice to see us admit insolvency!!!

Cut heavy tank program, hydrogen bomb, B-36, ~~to~~ very heavy carrier, and similar programs should all be decreased from the standpoint of compatibility

purposes,
special & unique capabilities
unencapsulated need
duplicatory effort
necessity.

In the same way the whole organization of the Army
N Navy (incl. marines)
Air

should be ruthlessly pulled apart & examined in order to get down to the country's requirements.

We should re-examine our whole philosophy of defense, in its foreign & domestic aspects & do what is intelligent for democracies to do. Industrial mobilization could save our nation (if properly planned for) under our whole peace time military struggle might cost us ten times as much & largely fail in a panic. (In 1941, our peace time Navy took a tremendous blow on

the first day of the war – but the Navy built after the war started did a great job in both oceans; particularly against Japan where it really, with air force help, won the war! And this does not ignore the work of the great divisions that won & held the bases from which air attacks were made.

If we don't have the objective, industry-government-professional examination that will show us when & how to proceed in this armament business we will go broke and still have <u>inefficient</u> defense. We can have security without paying the price of national bankruptcy, if we will put brains in the balance. We cannot afford prejudice, preconceived notions, fallacies, duplications, luxuries, foreign political advantage, etc. etc. Our country is at stake. Many will give her lip service; few will give her self-sacrificing sweat and <u>brains</u>!!

Monday, 29 October 1951

Today I was visited by several individuals who brought up the political struggle in the United States. Chief among these were Mr. Weir, Head of the National Steel Company; and Mr. Harold Talbott who, as I understand it, has been associated with Republican politics for some years.

In general, the argument of both men was the same. It is about as follows:

a. In the absence of some serious opposition, Mr. Taft is going to capture the Republican nomination for President before the convention itself meets. In other words, when the convention convenes, there will be so many delegates pledged to him that opposition will be useless.

b. That Mr. Taft can get in an election the solid vote of the old-line Republicans, but no others. Specifically, Mr. Talbott said he could get no votes from anybody under 30 years of age. The further statement was made that in our country today are 40% Democrats, 31% Republicans, and 28% Independents. This last figure was completely astonishing to me and I doubt its accuracy.

c. The proof is clear, according to these gentlemen, that Taft cannot be elected President of the United States. Fundamentally, they believe that Taft's lack of appeal is the belief in the United States that he represents a reactionary type of thinking, and especially that he represents a reactionary wing of the Republican Party.

d. Mr. Truman, they believe, would beat Mr. Taft very easily. Mr. Weir said that any other Democrat could likewise beat Mr. Taft.

e. Four years more of Democratic, uninterrupted, government in our country will put us so far on the road to socialism that there will be no return to a free enterprise. They firmly believe that we would follow the example of Britain until we became fully socialized, which means, of course, fully regimented.

f. That the only way to halt this chain of events and to give the United States a breathing space is for me to make a proper move within a reasonable time (although neither man stated the exact time) to allow all elements of Republican Party, other than the supporters of Taft, to nominate me as President. They think that I would be easily elected because of what they call my appeal among Independents and also among certain sections of the Democratic Party.

29 Oct 51

These representations happen to coincide with four letters that I received today from people at home (one of them completely unknown to me), outlining the same argument. The whole business is merely repetitive and, except for the utter seriousness with which it is presented, it grows very monotonous. It is certainly burdensome.

In reply, I said to these men as I have said before:

a. I do not want to be President of the United States, and I want no other political office or political connection of any kind.

b. I am now on a job in which success is of the most tremendous importance to the future of the United States.

c. One of the great factors in producing success in this job is support from the bulk of the American population. Consequently, I have no right to announce any partisan leanings of any kind, because to do so would jeopardize the great project on which the United States is spending so much money and on which her future so clearly depends.

d. I entered upon this post only from a sense of duty - I certainly had to sacrifice much in the way of personal convenience, advantage, and congenial constructive work when I left New York. I will never leave this post for any other kind of governmental task except in response to a clear call to duty. I will not be a participant in any movement that attempts to secure for me a nomination because I believe that the Presidency is something that should never be sought, just as I believe, of course, that it could never be refused. What future circumstances could convince me that I had a duty to enter the political arena, I am not prepared to say. I simply do not know what they could be. I merely admit that, as of now, I would consider the nomination of which they speak, if accomplished without any direct or indirect assistance or connivance on my part, to place upon me a transcendent duty.

e. Because of these convictions, if ever I should decide that I have a political duty to perform, it would be incumbent upon me instantly to submit my resignation to the President.

It is difficult indeed to maintain the attitude I tried to explain to my visitors. It would be much easier to simply have done with the whole business by arbitrarily declining to give it any thought whatsoever. Possibly I shall do this yet. As of now, I see nothing to do but to keep my mouth shut.

Oct. 30.

Mr. Colby Chester came in this morning to repeat the same argument. He also brought to me a letter from a Texas mother.

Nov. 9.

Senator Benton visited me to show that I have no true spiritual and intellectual affinity with the Republicans. His argument have been made to me before — but he had a hard time when I asked him about some of the Democratic stalwarts, McKellar et al.. He merely insisted that there are more ignorant, venal, repulsive individuals in position of influence in the Republican party than in the Democratic.

Tom Campbell came in the afternoon. He doesn't care what party I'm in — prefers Republican liberals — but says U.S. demands me in politics.

Nov. 10. This morning Congressman Javits (my dist. in N.Y.) tells me that I must lead, instruct and exhort on basic issues in America. Because we traditionally think of Pres. as our only real leader there is much talk of me for Presidency. (He is one working in this direction.) But what the U.S. really wants of me, he says, is to give the country my convictions, fancies and information — particularly in field of foreign affairs.

Nov. 16.

Paul Hoffman and "Tex" Moore (Chairman of the Board, Time, Inc) came to see me 4 or 5 days ago. The purpose was (as always) to convince me I must get into the political business. I replied (as always) that any word of mine on this subject before I was relieved from current responsibilities would be flatly negative. Since such a reply doesn't seem logical (except in response to some current solicitation) I again urged that the progressive Republicans get behind some one else and work. To my mind Lodge, Hoffman, Driscoll or, possibly, Gov. Peterson of Nebraska could be built up if the necessary work could be done. I'd be delighted to see any of them occupy the President's chair. The trouble is that the practical politician just dismisses such an idea with — "It can't be done!" and yet we can see Crazy Crystals, Hamm's Beer, and Pepsi-Cola!

(Incidentally my real choice for Pres. — by virtue of character, understanding, administrative ability and personality is my youngest brother — Milton!)

Today Mr. Bradford, Vice-Pres. of United Press came in with the same story.

Gen. Bradley called this a.m. He was accompanied by Vice-Adm Davis. They wanted to discuss the Rome meeting of NATO. They fear that the question of incorporating Greece & Turkey into ~~SHAPE~~ a NATO military command may be brought up & wanted to discuss possibilities with me. The real complication arises out of the insistence of both countries that they must be in S.H.A.P.E. — they will not, initially at least, agree to their incorporation into a Mid-East Command, to be headed by a British Supreme. Last month I told Bradley that the Mid-East Command was certain to be a "can of worms". Many returning travellers have told me that the Greeks & Turks have a certain belief that under this by they'd be safe — in a Mid-East Command they'd be in a dangerous situation. I am afraid there was not much skill used in making the approach to the Greeks & Turks; they are seemingly determined to oppose the simple and easy solution to the organizational question. The act. meeting between standing group and those 2 nations got nowhere!

Nov 24
#1

Jean {Monnet / Monnet} came to see me. He cannot go to the Rome meeting & is anxious that I stress the need for European amalgamation in political as well as the economic steps involved in Schuman Plan and European Army. Since I believe implicitly in the idea I shall do so, even if some of the politicos present resent my intrusion into their fields. America has spent billions in ECA, and is spending more billions in MDAP, and much of it will be sheer waste unless Europe coalesces. Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Italy and Western Germany should form the Federated States. To help this America could afford to spend a lot, because we'd get something successful, strong, sturdy!

But the politicos throw up their hands in fright & hopelessness. I doubt that even America could get many of them to fight courageously for this vitally essential development! (I make a speech last Friday, including on subject).

Nov. 24 (cont)

Day before yesterday I completed a trip to welcome the Canadian Brigade & the 28th and 43d U.S. Divisions to Europe. The men I saw were units seem to me exceptional: possibly my advancing age makes all young men look intelligent, spirited, strong.

Today 9 engineers came to see me. Subject: "Expenditures in the Executive Departments." Is to be questioned about centralized procurement agencies; on the basis of past experience, not on my present job. I have enough to do; I grow weary having to give attention to some one else's task. The Committee could learn more by hiring an ignoramus & Effing Engineers + staying right in Washington than it can by globe trotting for a solid year.

Dec. 11

A day or so I received a comforting letter from Cabot Lodge, who has been selected by a number of Republican politicians, of the progressive wing, as their leader in the effort to nominate me for the Presidency. He says that the project is hopeless without my active pre-convention cooperation! That settles the whole matter! As to the path of duty in the possible case of an honest Republican draft I could have (do have) honest doubts. But there is no slightest doubt in my mind as to the impropriety — almost the illegality — of my pre-convention activity as long as I am on this job. So — since I cannot in good conscience guide here, my reaction is "Hurrah!" I've just prepared a letter to Cabot saying that he and his friends must stop the whole thing, now.

The Rome meetings were, in many ways, highly valuable and, certainly, interesting. Because there was no startling development to hand to the press the reports have been of a paraphrastic & cynical tenor! In spite of difficulties (and God knows they are big) there is no cause to despair!

Dec. 15

Gov. Stassen came to see me. He is trying to get the Rep. nomination, but calculates his chances as very low. But he feels that by trying he keeps the party from surrendering to the reactionaries. He is still asserting that if I will enter the race before "it becomes too late" he will immediately announce as my friend. The nice thing about his visit was that he asked me nothing — he, as he said, merely reported developments, and re-stated his position, frequently given to me during the many months since 1948. In any event, I said nothing except that "Do as you please. I'm busy at my duties. I shall never, in advance of a convention, indicate a political intention."

— xxxx —

From every side, in Europe, I get complaint reference Britain's attitude toward a European Army.

21 December 1951

(X) With reference to the Stassen visit, I intended to summarize the account he gave to me. He has done that himself in the form of a note which I have just received. It is contained in my correspondence files under his name.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dec. 18th 1951.

Dear Ike:- The columnists, the slick magazines and all the political people, who like to speculate are saying many things about what is to happen in 1952.

As I told you in 1948 and at our luncheon in 1951, do what you think best for the country. My own position is in the balance. If I do what I want to do, I'll go back to Missouri and maybe run for the Senate. If you decide to finish the European job (and I don't know who else can) I must keep the isolationists out of the White House. I wish you would let me know what you intend to do. It will be between us and no one else.

I have the utmost confidence in your judgement and your patriotism. My best to you and Mrs. Ike for a happy holiday season.

Most sincerely,

Harry Truman

General of the Army,
Dwight D. Eisenhower,
Paris, France.

21 December 1951

Two or three days ago, the Prime Minister of Great Britain made a visit to SHAPE. He was accompanied by the British Ambassador to France and by Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary.

Our talk largely centered around the concept of a European Army. General Gruenther has made a rather extensive summary of the conversation, but it is easy to see that the plans presently under discussion on the Continent do not conform with the ideas Mr. Churchill has had in mind. Consequently, he is very lukewarm - it is better to say he is instinctively opposed - toward them. However, since we here agree with him that the attempt to make Great Britain a participant in the European Army project would only slow the matter up, it is clear that his personal opinions have no real significance except as they affect the warmth of his political and moral support.

It is quite true that Europe really needs the morale and support of Great Britain; several of the Continental countries have become accustomed to look to Britain for this kind of leadership. We had a very warm discussion on the whole matter and, while I most certainly did not convince him, I am sure that he realizes he must do something in the way of giving us the kind of support we ask. He is quite ready to admit that, in the long run, a politically unified Western Europe is essential to the welfare and security of the free world. He is likewise ready to admit that we should try to make the formation of a European Army one of the stepping stones toward such a political union. But he balks at the idea of attempting to set up a single ministry to deal with the administrative and other ministerial problems of a European Army and will go no further, in his own convictions, than to propose and support some kind of a coalition force. In other words, he wants to go back to exactly the thing we had in World War II and merely multiply the number of participating nations (and most certainly multiplying the difficulties).

Frankly, I believe that, subconsciously, my great friend is trying to re-live the days of his greatest glory. He has taken upon his own shoulders, as he did in World War II, the dual position of Prime Minister and of Defense Minister. He is struggling hard to bring about a recognition of specially close ties between America and Britain, and is soon to depart for the United States in furtherance of this purpose. I am back in Europe in a status that is not too greatly different, in his mind, from that which I held with respect to him in World War II. To my mind, he simply will not think in terms of today, but rather only those of the war years. (Yet it is a curious fact that, in spite of his insistence that men must wear their own national uniforms, wave their own national flags, sing their own national hymns, and serve under their own national officers, it is still true that in the late summer of 1942 he offered to put British soldiers in American uniforms in order to facilitate their entry into North Africa. For that one moment, he saw a special need and, therefore, acted in accordance with that need.)

My regretful opinion is that the Prime Minister no longer absorbs new ideas; exertation and appeals to the emotions and sentiment still have some effect on him - exposition does not.

January 1, 1952

Dear Mr. President:

Your letter of December 18 was delayed in transit, not reaching me until the 28th. At that moment I was intensively engaged in an effort to spur our European friends into developing an acceptable plan for a European Army as well as, eventually, some form of European political Union. All this explains the time required for my answer to reach you. I am deeply touched by the confidence in me you express, even more by that implied in the writing of such a letter by the President of the United States. It breathes your anxious concern for our country's future.

Part of my answer must almost paraphrase your own language where you say, "If I do what I want to do . . ." There has never been any change in my personal desires and aspirations, publicly and privately expressed, ~~often~~ over the past six years or so. I'd like to live a semi-retired life with my family, given over mainly to the study of, and a bit of writing on, present day trends and problems, with a little dirt farming thrown in on the side. But just as you have decided that circumstances may not permit you to do exactly as you please, so I've found that fervent desire may sometimes have to give way to a conviction of duty. For example - I'm again on military duty and in a foreign country!

Now, I do not feel that I have any duty to seek a political nomination, in spite of the fact that many have urged to the contrary. Because of this belief I shall not do so. Moreover, to engage in this kind of activity while on my present military assignment would encourage partisan thinking in our country toward a project of the utmost importance to the nation as a whole. (Incidentally it would be in direct violation of Army Regulations.) So I shall keep still in all this struggle for personal position in a political party. Of course, a number of people know of my belief that any group of American citizens has a right to fight, politically, for any set of principles in which its members believe and to attempt to draft a leader to head the fight!

~~Because of these beliefs and~~ because particularly of my determination to remain silent you know, far better than I, that the possibility that I will ever be drawn into political activity is so remote as to be negligible. This policy of complete abstention will be meticulously observed by me unless and until extraordinary circumstances would place a mandate upon me that, by common consent, would be deemed a duty of transcendent importance.

This answer is as full and frank as I am able to devise (~~and~~ not I would be very regretful if you thought it otherwise.) But when one attempts to discuss such important abstractions as a sense of duty applied to unforseen circumstances of the future neither brevity nor arbitrary pronouncement seems wholly applicable.

This note brings to you and yours, from Mamie and me, our best wishes for a happy and prosperous 1952. To you personally, my continued esteem and regard.

Respectfully,

(Original handwritten)

/s/ DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Jan 10 – '52

On the 7th, due to a series of incidents I decided to issue a short statement of my convictions concerning any possible connection between me and the current political contest in the U.S. My position is that in doing a duty – I should not leave it except if called to a more important duty. I would so consider a nomination by the Republican party.

The immediate cause of my statement was an announcement by Senator Lodge on Sunday the 6th that he intended to enter my name in the N.H. primaries. In answer to questions he said I'd be a candidate for the Rep. nomination. Time & again I've told anyone who'd listen that I will not seek a nomination. I don't give a d — how impossible a "draft" may be. I'm willing to go part way in trying to recognize a "duty" — but I do not have to seek one — and I will not.

So – my statement made these things clear — and if there is any more misunderstanding I don't see how it can be charged to me.

22 January 1952

This morning's paper states that the President's budget, just submitted to Congress, amounts to something over eighty-five billion dollars, with a contemplated deficit for the year of fourteen billion. Only in two of the years of World War II has an American budget equalled this figure - it is a record for peacetime. Of the budget, the paper states that approximately sixty-five billion is to be applied to military preparedness, including help for our Allies.

I have not been a party to any of the military estimates included in the budget. I know that the men who have made the studies are capable, honest, and patriotic. Yet I know something of the methods of making such estimates, and I am well acquainted with some of the countries in which the size of national budgets has stifled initiative and caused great difficulties otherwise.

I am very greatly afraid that certain basic truths are being forgotten or ignored in our public life of today. The first of these is that a democracy undertakes military preparedness only on a defensive, which means a long-term, basis. We do not attempt to build up to a D-day because, having no intention of our own to attack, we must devise and follow a system that we can carry as long as there appears to be a threat in the world capable of endangering our national safety.

As far back as 1945 and even earlier, I began discussing these subjects with the President, Members of Congress, businessmen, personal friends, and others. I talked with Jim Forrestal more than with anyone else about these things because of his very great honesty of purpose and his dedication to public service. Moreover, he was so personally concerned by the dangers that our nation was incurring that he wanted to talk about these things. Some of my associates in the Service and in other governmental or civil positions have been equal to Jim Forrestal in selflessness, but few have had his insatiable desire to learn and then to apply his knowledge for the public good. So we explored and searched together to see if we could define an appropriate course in language clear enough to be specific and yet general enough to be applicable over a period of time.

Almost everything that we came to think important could be classed as obvious fact, some so obvious as to be trite. Nevertheless, one of the facts we agreed upon is that, more and more, we seem to be in need of education in the obvious, whereas too many so-called educators take great delight in pushing us further and further into the obscure.

We felt that it is necessary to recognize that the purpose of America is to defend a way of life rather than merely to defend property, territory, homes, or lives. As a consequence of this purpose, everything done to develop a defense against external threat, except under conditions readily recognizable as emergency, must be weighed and gauged in the light of probable long-term, internal, effect. For example, we can and do adopt in time of war restrictive practices that, if applied in time of peace, would constitute serious damage to the system of government set up by our Constitution. Censorship, price controls, allocation of materials and commodities, and the like are necessary in a great war. In time of peace, certain of these controls could possibly be applied in unusual and serious circumstances, but only in the event that there are some specific self-limiting provisions included so that shrewd politicians cannot, through the manufacture of continuous emergency, do permanent damage to our system.

This need for avoiding damage to our system markedly influenced Jim and me as we approached the development of estimates as to military requirements. No argument is needed to show that excessive expenditures for non-productive items could, in the long run, destroy the American economy. National bankruptcy would necessitate a type of control or confiscation of property that would be in utter contradiction to the assurances and safeguards of our Constitution. At the other extreme, the traditional tendency in our country in time of peace has been to neglect the armed forces to the extent of folly. Even subsequent to World War II, with everybody, including ourselves, hoping for some kind of "modus vivendi" with the Russians, this traditional tendency had to be combatted. From 1945 to the day of his death, Jim Forrestal devoted his most earnest efforts to this horn of the dilemma, because American thinking seemed to be again afflicted with complacency and disbelief, while he never once wavered from his profound conviction that Communism was our great threat - that Communistic Russia would never relax its pressure against us as long as we were exponents of free government.

In the very early days of 1947, when Jim was Secretary of the Navy and I was Chief of Staff (Bob Patterson was Secretary of War) and we had preliminary talks on this subject, we came to the general conclusion that if we would be provident and prudent in the salvaging and preserving of materials left over from World War II, and our money would suffer no depreciation, we should be able to produce a minimum defensive structure, reasonably appropriate to our needs, with a yearly expenditure for all Services of fifteen billion dollars (exclusive of stockpiling and other expenses of that type).

In several conversations, the President seemed to agree to this general calculation but expressed the hope that our relations with Russia could be steadily developed to the point where this sum could be substantially reduced. Of course, all of us agreed with the hope, but Jim himself believed that we should be prepared to carry a load of this magnitude for a good many years.

The reason that we felt it so important to make some estimate of this kind is that one of the most expensive practices in the maintenance of military force is unevenness in the scale of preparedness and in yearly appropriation. Peaks in one year or a series of years, followed by unwise reductions in a period when economy is the sole watchword, tend to demand extraordinary expenditures with no return. Consequently, we very greatly hoped to produce a plan and budget that would be, in effect, an element of bipartisan policy, and which would be as free as possible of the defects and costs brought about by yearly cuts or increases, usually due to impulses or aberrations of the moment.

In the 1945 days of our association - really before we became firm friends - Jim Forrestal and I differed seriously on one subject. This was the proposal for unifying the three Services. He had visited me, twice, during 1944, while I was still commanding at SHAEF. Although he was primarily concerned, at that time, in other subjects, we mentioned this one casually. I thought he believed in unification, but I was obviously mistaken. Of course, neither of us failed to see the need for close coordination between the Services and unified control both of operational and of budgetary planning. Our difference involved the best methods to accomplish this. At first, he was afraid that the scheme that I supported would glorify the military at the expense of civilian control. I tried to prove to him that the opposite was true. He favored "committee" as opposed to "single" civilian authority. (In

need for avoiding damage to our system markedly influenced him and me as we approached the development of estimates as to military requirements. No argument is needed to show that excessive expenditures for non-productive items could, in the long run, destroy the American economy. National bankruptcy would inevitably bring about the collapse of our defense structure. Accordingly, we should be able to produce a minimum and our money would suffer no depreciation. We should be able to produce a military establishment adequate to the assumed peril that we should be prepared to certain basic minimum requirements of our Constitution. At the other end of the scale, the President seemed to agree to this general calculation in several conversations. (In fact, he (President Eisenhower) stated that he would be satisfied if we could be sure that we could get the money.)

The reason that we felt it so important to make some estimate of this kind is that one of the most expensive practices in the maintenance of military force is uneven-ness in the scale of preparedness and in very erratic appropriation. Peace in one year or a series of years, followed by minimal reductions in a period when economy is the sole watchword, tend to demand extraordinary expenditures with no return. Consequently, we very freely poked to produce a plan and budget that would be, in effect, an element of physical policy, and which would be as free as possible of the defects and costs brought about by very erratic cuts or increases, usually due to implanes or operations of the moment.

In the 1945 days of our association - really before we became firm friends - Jim Forrestal and I differed vertically on one angle. This was the proposal for unifying the three Services. He had argued me, twice, during 1944, while I was in other angles, we mentioned this one casually. I thought he believed in unification, but I was obviously mistaken. Of course, neither of us failed to see the need for close coordination between the Services and unified control both of operational and of budgetary planning. Our difference involved the best method to accomplish this. At first, he was stated that the scheme that I supported would glorify the military at the expense of civilian control. I tried to prove to him that the opposite was true. He favored "committees" as opposed to "single" civilian authority. (In

this connection, it is interesting to note that almost the last recommendation that Jim Forrestal ever submitted, in 1949, plead for a higher degree of centralization of authority in the Defense Department.)

Our fifteen billion dollar goal was never realized in any year. Every kind of attack was made upon our estimates and all sorts of chiseling took place. Incidentally, all of us were aware of the habit of bureaucrats to ask for greater appropriations than they reasonably expected to get. This had been the practice of many, on the theory that, since Congress was bound to cut appropriations in order to show that it was "economy minded," the only recourse was to pad original estimates to the extreme limit of possible justification. Following the war, the men with whom I worked (and this includes all that I can now remember) decided that we would refuse to follow with this practice. We would ask for what we believed to be the minimum needed and then stand honestly and firmly behind our estimates and conclusions when we were called before appropriate Congressional Committees. (I since have sadly concluded that we were a bit naive.)

The chiseling and cutting of estimates was accompanied and made worse by a steadily depreciating value of the dollar. Thus, in the fiscal years 1947, 1948, 1949, and 1950, the defense fabric continued to shrink at an alarming extent - and this in spite of frequent protestations - on the part of responsible officials.

I personally left the Office of Chief of Staff in February 1948, but already the situation was drifting to the point that I tried to bring certain of my convictions to the attention of the public rather than merely to couch them in terms of recommendations to governmental superiors. For example, in a book I published in 1948, I warned of the dangers of deficiency in military strength although, of course, I did not believe it appropriate or proper for me to recite the many instances where the recommendations of my associates and myself had been rejected or disregarded. It is interesting to speculate where we would now find ourselves had it not been for the Communistic invasion of South Korea and the consequent awakening of the whole free world to the warnings that people like Jim Forrestal had been expressing time and time again in previous years.

Now I am afraid that we are risking damage from the other horn of the dilemma - that is, the danger of internal deterioration through the annual expenditure of unconscionable sums on a program of indefinite duration, extending far into the future. This is a subject which I am bound, in my present position, practically to ignore. It has great political significance at home and I have already publicly stated that, if the Republicans decide to place a political mandate upon me, I would not attempt to evade it. Therefore, if I should, while on this critical military duty in SHAPE, attempt to express my convictions about the matter, I would at the very least destroy my usefulness to the country in this program in which it is embarked. However, the only justification for the imposition of an expenditure program that foresees a minimum fourteen billion deficit is an immediate prospect of war - an emergency which removes all normal limitations upon maximum financial, industrial, and military effort. We are not told that this budget is for the emergency of a single year; therefore, our people can only assume that we plan to continue the practice on the same scale.

I am astonished that an administration including, after all, many men of conservative and cautious tendencies could have approved or at least concurred in such a

budget. Men like Symington, Lovett, Sawyer, Finletter, and Kimball certainly must see the terrific dangers of such a program, unless it is stated to be specifically of an emergency character and definitely limited in a way to show that it is so contemplated and regarded.

In this case, there is newspaper speculation to the effect that these budgets will continue to rise at least until 1954 and then possibly to "level off." If this is true (and I cannot believe for a moment that it is), then we are headed for worse than trouble. The effect will be disastrous.

I realize, of course, that if the Russians should commit the great blunder of venturing upon global war, or even if we should stumble into such a tragic situation, then the people now urging expenditures of this type in the name of security will be hailed in history as men of vision, foresight, and great wisdom. But I know that those men have no better access to secret or otherwise valuable information than I have. There is no greater probability of war today than there was two years ago; and no one can say for certain that there is any greater probability of deliberately provoked war at the end of this year or of next than there is now. We can say only that properly balanced strength will promote the probability of avoiding war. In this sense, we need the strength soon - but it must be balanced between moral power, economic power, and purely military power.

Reasonable men have no recourse except to plan on the basis of stable, relatively assured income and outgo. To do otherwise is adventure far beyond the point of reason. Not only do I believe that military expenditures themselves should be cut, but I believe that the government today should take the lead in establishing rigid measures of economy and efficiency in all its activities so as to accomplish at a very minimum some ten to twenty percent savings in all these other activities.

Only two or three years ago the President told me very solemnly that an aggregate national budget of more than forty-two billion dollars would quickly spell unconscionable inflation in the United States. Today we talk about eighty-five billion and apparently mean it to be indefinitely prolonged into the future.

In considering this subject, of course it is necessary to make allowances for ample support of the war in Korea. No one has ever given me even a vague estimate as to what that war is costing, although I have asked a number of supposedly responsible officials. Possibly many of them are just as uninformed as I am. Cutting of appropriations does not apply to the conduct of that war, which should, of course, be supported earnestly. (Incidentally, I might remark that I am one of those who believes that we did the right thing in defying and opposing the Communist advance into Southern Korea. While it is manifestly an awkward place in which to fight, and there seems to be no satisfactory conclusion to the struggle, yet it is my own opinion that, had we allowed the South Korean Republic, which was sponsored by the free nations, to go under, we would have by this time been kicked out of Southeast Asia completely, and it would be touch and go as to whether India would still be outside the Iron Curtain. If we had lost those areas, I do not know exactly how we would obtain some of the raw materials we now import from those regions.)

If we do not, as American citizens, weigh this situation and reach a reasonable answer in this year's appropriations, we will be so committed to a possibly unwise military program that either we will begin to go far more rapidly down the inflation road or we will again have to accomplish a sudden and expensive contraction in that program. In this latter case, much of this year's appropriations would have, of course, gone down the drain.

Jan. 29. – 1952

Two friends I highly respect – George Sloan and George Whitney have both told me I have a duty, a responsibility, to state my views on "the important issues of the day". I've written letters to both, arguing the point. I'll enclose a copy of one in this book.

N.A.T.O. is going schizophrenic. On the one hand it develops encouragingly, on the other it is very ill.

Understanding and morale increase. Europe is much closer than ever before to establishing the kind of union among the free countries of this region that safety and prosperity demand. But the economic pattern is bleak; our Congress will soon have to be told that there is no chance of material progress equalling initial promises. This is true <u>even</u> in the <u>U.S.</u> The result ????,

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117th

Jacqueline Cochran is here with a tape and picture record of the "Lexington Rally" at Madison Sq. Garden on the 9th. I am to see the whole business this eve; undoubtedly some publicity will be generated out of my mere viewing it. I can't help it; the performance at the Garden is not my something to make an American feminity proud — it is something to increase his humility, his sense of his own unworthiness to fulfill the spoken & unspoken desires & aspirations of so many thousands of humans.

Our times are humiliating — people are relaxing to instinct, emotion & sentiment & responsibility is becoming again something real, not just an abstraction.

12 Feb. '52

The picture brought by Miss Cochrane was very elaborate and long. Viewing it finally developed into a real emotional experience for Mamie and me. Lives not been so upset in years. Clearly to be seen is the mass longing of America for some kind of reasonable solution for her nagging, persistent and almost terrifying problems. It's a real experience to realize that one could become a symbol for many thousands of the hope they have!!

Harry Luce came to see me. He is stimulating.

28 Feb. 52

The Lisbon meeting of NATO ministers has terminated. Its results were all that I could have expected, even more. If the sober calculations on which our plans are now based can be governing in all countries this coming year I should estimate that within a short time this job can fairly be considered as "on the rails".

Political people at home urge me to ask now for leave. That strikes me as next to insane. Possibly my work here is not so important as is the work devolving upon the Pres. of the U.S. — but to my mind it is more important than seeking the Presidency. But if they will let me alone it is possible that I can soon (several months) turn the job over to another!

Now I go to Turkey & Greece. More headaches & problems!!!

June 17, 1951

Dear Dad:

The PX is as devoid of Fathers' Day cards as we are of ideas for a present. We can only show our remembrance, therefore, with the unconventional though perhaps preferable device of a note.

We want you to know that the old saw about a prophet's not being appreciated at home is very much out of place here. The generosity and understanding with which you and Mother treat us make it the rarest privilege in the world to be the "junior Eisenhowers."

Lots of love,

Barbara,
Johnnie
Anne
David

OPINION


MacArthur


Marshall


Wedemeyer


Saltzman


Leahy


Smith

The Generals Take Over

The December issue of *Harper's Magazine* carries a leading article, "The Military Move In," that is so brave and honest and important as to be almost sensational. What is particularly impressive about the piece is that the author can be accused neither of being an amateur nor a Communist. He is Hanson W. Baldwin, the conservative military analyst of the even more conservative *New York Times*, and perhaps the foremost American civilian specialist in his chosen field.

Baldwin's theme is one with which PM readers are not unfamiliar—the increasing military domination of American life and the steady drift towards the "garrison state." It is, by the way, in itself a commentary on the current climate of opinion in this country that such a highly regarded writer as Baldwin should think it necessary to start his weighty argument on a note of apology. "I must emphasize," he writes, "that I am *not* a follower of Henry Wallace – nor, of course, a Communist, nor a fellow-traveler." Having thus established his credentials, he proceeds to demonstrate, with a wealth of data and persuasive reason, that the "growing influence of the military in American life is dangerous to our democratic liberties."

This is not written in criticism of any of these men as individuals. They are devoted public servants and in some instances above the average in ability. But, as Baldwin rightly points out, together they represent a dangerous military pattern. "They have in common the habit of command and discipline and the mental outlook of years of military training—a tendency to apply the yardstick of physical power." That is what makes this formidable accumulation of brass in strategic civilian posts such a threat to the future of democracy.

Preparation for Total War

One of the root reasons for this situation is the quiet but relentless preparation for total war that is now taking place in this country. Though the present mobilization, as yet incomplete and in its early stages, is not for purposes of aggression, in the long run the effect is bound to be just the same—militarization of the youth, concentration of political and economic power in a few hands, and a systematic suppression of the main freedoms. This is, in essence, what is meant by the "garrison state," and no one can deny that, since the death of FDR, the first [illegible]

¶ Industry is being integrated with the military through such organizations as the Navy Industrial Association and the Army Ordnance Association. Industrialists are being directly influenced through off-the-record meetings, cruises, junkets, and "strategic" orders.

¶ Perhaps the most dangerous and insidious of all is the growing influence which the armed forces are exerting upon the American mind. The services maintain large and carefully trained public relations staffs and their lobby is probably the most powerful in the country. The lobby plays both upon the general public and the Congress. It uses all the well known and tested devices of propaganda, pressure, judicious censorship at the source, veterans organizations' spokesmen, "confidential" leaks, "big names," specially arranged trips for Congressmen, and where necessary the smear ("crackpot," "pacifist," "Communist").

"We are spending," Baldwin writes, "more than $10,000,000,000 annually on our armed forces, or more than $70 apiece per person in the United States; we maintain uniformed forces totaling more than 1,500,000 men, the largest navy in the world, one of the largest [illegible]

position so quietly and cleverly that the public has not been alarmed. But the time has come to ring the tocsin, or we will find ourselves one day racing along the same path as Germany.

It is, indeed, striking how many parallels there are between the United States today and Germany, say, between 1890 and 1914. In both we find a booming economy; expanding world markets; concentration of wealth in a few hands; the growing power of gigantic monopolies; a tendency to rule the world and to feel superior to it; reliance upon military might; emphasis upon sheer strength. It is a nightmarish thought that we may also repeat the disastrous mistakes of the Germans.

For if history shows anything, it shows that when a people relies for its security upon power alone, and places its future in the hands of the professional military, it is doomed to get exactly what it tries to avoid. The Founding Fathers knew that; the great American statesmen and thinkers knew that. But we, living in the age of the atom when total war must mean total loss of the basic liberties and probably also total destruction, seem to be blundering away from the lesson of all [illegible]

garrison state. It is, by the way, in itself a commentary on the current climate of opinion in this country that such a highly regarded writer as Baldwin should think it necessary to start his weighty argument on a note of apology. "I must emphasize," he writes, "that I am *not* a follower of Henry Wallace – nor, of course, a Communist, nor a fellow-traveler." Having thus established his credentials, he proceeds to demonstrate, with a wealth of data and persuasive reason, that the "growing influence of the military in American life is dangerous to our democratic liberties."

List Tells The Story

The extent of the penetration of key civilian positions, or positions most of which should be and traditionally have been civilian, by Army and Navy personnel is seen from the following list:

¶ Lieut. Gen. Lucius D. Clay, governor of Germany.

¶ Maj. Gen. William H. Draper, Under Secretary for the Army.

¶ Brig. Gen. Frank T. Hines, ambassador to Panama.

¶ Gen. Thomas Holcomb, ambassador to South Africa.

¶ Lieut. Gen. Geoffrey Keyes, governor of Austria.

¶ Adm. Alan G. Kirk, ambassador to Belgium.

¶ Adm. William D. Leahy, intimate Presidential adviser and personal chief of staff.

¶ Gen. Douglas MacArthur, governor of Japan.

¶ Gen. George C. Marshall, Secretary of State.

¶ Brig. Gen. Kenneth C. Royall, Secretary for the Army.

¶ Brig. Gen. Charles E. Saltzman, Assistant Secretary of State.

¶ Lieut. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, ambassador to the Soviet Union.

¶ Lieut. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, head of special mission to China.

In addition, there are about 13 American military missions scattered throughout South America, and they, like their German prototypes under the German Kaiser, wield great political and military influence.

One of the root reasons for this situation is the quiet but relentless preparation for total war that is now taking place in this country. Though the present mobilization, as yet incomplete and in its early stages, is not for purposes of aggression, in the long run the effect is bound to be just the same—militarization of the youth, concentration of political and economic power in a few hands, and a systematic suppression of the main freedoms. This is, in essence, what is meant by the "garrison state," and no one can deny that, since the death of FDR, the first steps in that direction have already been taken. Propaganda is now at work to prepare for the next steps.

Consider what has already happened:

¶ The War and Navy Departments have been united under a Secretary of Defense with Cabinet status, and three other Secretaries who could sit in the Cabinet if the President so wished. This will give the armed forces preponderant representation in the Cabinet.

¶ The War Department's Policy and Strategy Group and the Navy's Politico-Military Affairs section have been tied with the State Department in one Coordinating Committee ("Swink").

U. S. Follows German Model

¶ The reorganization of the armed forces provides for a staff of 100 officers to serve under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This is modelled after the German General Staff which, as is well known, became the real ruler of Germany, especially after Bismarck. There is also a provision for one unified commander (the Navy still refuses to agree) who, in an emergency, will have absolute power over the life of the Nation. "Not even Britain or Germany in the extremities of the last war," comments Baldwin, "found the need for any such organization as this!"

¶ By means of subsidies and higher salaries, the military has entered the field of science to an enormous extent. In physics and related areas, it has already imposed severe intellectual restrictions, even where security does not call for it.

¶ ROTC courses have been enlarged and increased.

of propaganda, pressure, judicious censorship at the source, veterans organizations' spokesmen, "confidential" leaks, "big names," specially arranged trips for Congressmen, and where necessary the smear ("crackpot," "pacifist," "Communist").

"We are spending," Baldwin writes, "more than $10,000,000,000 annually on our armed forces, or more than $70 apiece per person in the United States; we maintain uniformed forces totaling more than 1,500,000 men, the largest navy in the world, one of the largest air forces, and an army second to none in equipment and second only to Russia's in size. Yet we are constantly told that our armed forces are 'weak,' and measures already presented to Congress (UMT, etc.) would add billions more to our defense budget."

The whole picture is particularly disturbing because the American people, who are certainly unmilitaristic and who share with Thomas Jefferson a traditional horror of powerful standing armies and all the military paraphernalia, have accepted the situation passively. There are, I think, two explanations for this. One is that the Nation is worried about security in a chaotic world; the other is that the armed forces have moved into

taxes of the Germans.

For if history shows anything, it shows that when a people relies for its security upon power alone, and places its future in the hands of the professional military, it is doomed to get exactly what it tries to avoid. The Founding Fathers knew that; the great American statesmen and thinkers knew that. But we, living in the age of the atom when total war must mean total loss of the basic liberties and probably also total destruction, seem to be blundering away from the lesson of all experience.

To halt the drift towards the "garrison state," we will have to, first of all, give up the dangerous illusion that we can achieve absolute security by any means, particularly by means of military dominance; secondly, we will have to return to civilian thinking and to a civilian regime where strategic policy positions are concerned; and thirdly, subordinate much of our incomparable power to some larger whole, perhaps a strengthened United Nations or an approximation toward a world government. There is really not much choice in the matter, unless, like the blind horse that just didn't give a damn, we insist upon running into the ditch.

—SAUL K. PADOVER

Inside Washington:

Exports to Russia Rise

Sy Freiday
Baldwin

WASHINGTON

While the controversy still rages over shipment of U. S. goods to Russia and her satellites, American business firms are stepping up their exports to the Soviet regions. But this is likely to be only a temporary situation—a cleaning up of back business.

Latest Commerce Dept. records show an upward trend for the month of October and it is expected that the rise will also be reflected in November figures when they become available.

On the basis of statistics now at hand, October exports to Russia amounted to $9,100,000. Most of the shipments consisted of machinery such as oil-drilling apparatus and electrical equipment. The value of the goods was three times the value of those exported by American firms to Russia in September, and twice the amount shipped in August.

Interestingly, American imports from Russia during October amounted to $7,835,000. Most of this—about 60 per cent—represented purchases of Russian furs, always an important item in the U. S.-Russian trade.

A majority of foreign trade experts believe that the reason for the increase in American deliveries to Russia can be traced to rising sentiment particularly in Congress, against doing business with the Soviets.

These experts believe that American firms have made every effort to speed up their deliveries against the possibility that there may be some advearse action in Congress to curtail future shipments.

There's lots of speculation on Capitol Hill, especially about who was speculating. — P.M.