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OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD
Washington 25, D. C.

May 25, 1955



MEMORANDUM TO: Members of the OCB Working Group on NSC 5514 (Korea)
SUBJECT : First Draft of Outline Plan of Operations on
NSC 5514 (Korea)

The attached working draft prepared in the Department of State, is transmitted as a basis for discussion at a working group meeting on Thursday, June 2, at 10:30 a.m., in Room 3025 New State.

The attention of the working group is invited to the following:

1. The draft does not represent formal State positions on all matters; it is intended for working group discussion.
2. Material from other responsible agencies is of course needed to complete the drafting of operations planned.
3. Section I is to be drafted by the working group, taking into account any recent estimates or other intelligence data.
4. Working group discussion will determine whether any items in the attached draft or in later proposals should be placed in Sections III and IV.
5. It is desirable to make the paper as specific and concrete as possible; working group members are urged to obtain from their Board Assistants or desk officers copies of the recently completed Outline Plan for Pakistan for comparison purposes.
6. The agreed working group paper is scheduled for transmission to the Executive Officer on Monday, June 27.

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John E. MacDonald
John E. MacDonald
OCB Staff Representative
NSC 5514 Working Group

Attachment:
DRAFT Outline Plan of Operations on NSC 5514 (Korea)
Dated May 25, 1955 (TOP SECRET)

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Cy #2 - BO
Cy #3 - EA
Cy #4 - SS
Cy #5 - Dr. Lilly
Cy #6 - Mr. MacDonald } # 32. time 34
Cy #7 - Mr. MacDonald }

Cys #8 thru 12 - Mr. Noel Hemmendinger - State
Cys #13 thru 19 - Mr. Arthur Way - OSD
Cys #20 thru 22 - [redacted] - CIA
Cys #23 thru 25 - Mr. Justin Williams - FOA
Cys #26 thru 28 - Mr. Wm. S. Petterson - USIA
Cys #29 & 30 - Mr. Paul D. Dickens - Treasury
Cy #31 - Mr. Joseph Philippbar - FOA

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OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD
Washington 25, D. C.

PURPOSE AND USE OF THIS OUTLINE PLAN OF OPERATIONS

This Outline Plan of Operations sets forth courses of action, responsibilities and timing prepared by the OCB in order to carry out NSC policy with respect to Korea (NSC 5514) for which the President has designated the OCB as the coordinating agency.

This outline plan does not encompass every U.S. agency activity or program but does include major programs, particularly those requiring interagency coordination. It includes contemplated important actions as well as those already in the process of being carried out.

Each agency has agreed to carry out the actions and programs contained in the plan subject to modification or review should a change in circumstances so indicate. Such changes will be agreed through normal interagency coordination, where appropriate, and will be made in accordance with usual procedures and through usual channels, and not necessarily with any formal amendment of this outline plan. A new plan will be prepared as soon as practicable following approval of a new or revised NSC statement of policy.

The Department of State will normally transmit the full text of approved outline plans to the chiefs or chief of mission concerned for use in exercising his coordinating responsibilities. Other agencies may transmit the complete plan or extracts thereof to senior field representatives on a strict "need-to-know" basis whenever such distribution is essential to effective implementation; provided that distribution to field representatives, when made, will normally be limited to those who are already holders of the basic NSC policy on which the outline plan is based.

Concurrence in this plan by the responsible agencies represented in the OCB does not automatically constitute authorization to operating officials to undertake new programs or modify existing programs, but shall serve as a basis for appropriate operating instructions to be developed by each of the participating agencies.

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OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD
Washington 25, D. C.

May 25, 1955

OUTLINE PLAN OF OPERATIONS ON
NSC 5514 WITH RESPECT TO KOREA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Reference: U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea (NSC 5514).
2. Present Situation: (To be drafted by the working group.)
3. Timing, Emphasis and Special Operating Guidance: (To be drafted by the working group.)



II. ACTIONS AGREED UPON

In taking action pursuant to this document, individual items under "Operations Planned" may be downgraded to the appropriate security classification.

Para. 4. "Widely publicize the fact that the Communists, with the connivance of the Communist members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, have violated the provisions of the Armistice Agreement since its inception.

Primary Responsibility: State,
Defense, USIA

Operations Planned:

By State

1. Transmit evidence of Communist violations to the Allies of the U.S. who are involved in Korea and, to the extent that this evidence is unclassified, urge our Allies to make wide public use of the information. Target date: As material is supplied by Defense.

By Defense

1. Produce as much clear and convincing evidence of Communist violations of the Armistice as possible, particularly in respect to violations of the reinforcing provisions. Target date: Continuing.

2. Instruct UNCMAC to utilize on a continuing basis and to the maximum extent possible evidence of Communist violations of the Armistice in charges and protests which it makes in the MAC. Target date: Immediate.

By State-Defense

1. State and Defense, in an effort to make clear in the public mind the fact and seriousness of Communist violations, should concert and, from time to time when appropriate opportunities arise, issue press releases

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or plant stories with reliable reporters constituting a general round up on the problem of Communist violations or an explanation of a more dramatic violation. Target date: Continuing.

By USIA

1. With guidance from State, see that the evidence and seriousness of Communist Armistice violations is given wide and effective publicity in foreign areas. Target date: Continuing.

Para. 5."a. Continue to observe the Armistice except as in b and c below.

b. Take such action as is necessary to deal with the situation caused by Communist violations of the Armistice when it is determined:

(1) That the UNC is at a significant disadvantage because of such violations.

(2) That the advantage of taking such action outweighs the military and political disadvantages thereof, including the possible non-agreement of the UNC allies to such a course. Prior agreement of our UNC allies for this action should be sought, but they should not be given a veto on U.S. action.

c. In the event of unprovoked Communist attack against U.S. military or non-military personnel, aircraft, or vessels outside Communist territory, take action in accordance with paragraph 5-g of NSC 5429/5, even though this may be construed as a violation of the Armistice."

Primary Responsibility: Defense and State

Operations Planned:

By Defense

1. Determine when the UN Command is at a significant disadvantage because of Communist violations of the Armistice. Target date: Continuing.

By Defense-State

1. When such a determination is made, decide jointly whether the advantages of taking action called for by this paragraph as is necessary to deal with the situation outweighs political and military disadvantages including the possible non-agreement of UN Command Allies to such a course. Target date: Contingent.

2. In order to persuade our Allies to concur in a course designed to rectify the situation of Communist violations

a. Defense should prepare a brief which presents convincing evidence -- classified if necessary -- of Communist violations, presents military reasons for taking such action including the military advantages



which thereby accrue to the UN Command and the manner in which the military disadvantages resulting from Communist violations can thus be effectively countered.

b. Defense should also prepare a convincing brief which can then be used publicly by the U.S. and its Allies in justification of action designed to counter Communist violations.

c. State should add to the military arguments appropriate political arguments and has responsibility for diplomatic negotiations on these issues with the Allies. Target date: Contingent.

Para. 6. " The U.S. should seek to ensure that the ROK does not unilaterally renew hostilities, by:

a. Continuing to make clear to ROK leaders where circumstances necessitate that if the ROK unilaterally initiates military operations against Chinese or North Korean forces in or north of the Demilitarized Zone then:

(1) UN Command ground, sea, and air forces will not support such operations directly or indirectly.

(2) The U.S. will not furnish any military or logistic support for such operations.

(3) All U.S. economic aid to Korea will cease immediately.

(4) The UN Commander will take any action necessary to prevent his forces becoming involved in the renewal of hostilities and to provide their security.

b. Continuing to persuade the ROK to maintain its forces under UN Command while that Command has responsibilities for the defense of Korea.

Primary Responsibility: State and Defense (Basic coordination for actions under this paragraph should be carried out in the field between Embassy Seoul and CINCUNC)

Operations Planned:

By State-Defense

1. Continue to coordinate and, when the occasion appears to require it, to make representations to ROK leaders with respect to the consequences of unilateral ROK renewal of hostilities. Target date: Continuing and contingent.

2. Continue to urge the ROK to maintain its forces under the UN Command as long as that Command has responsibility for the defense of Korea. Target date: Continuing.



"c. Making UN Command plans and dispositions which will reinforce the statements made to ROK leaders under a above and manifest U.S. determination to carry them out, in so far as this is consistent with sound military deployments to cope with a Communist attack."

Para. 7. "In anticipation of the possibility that President Rhee may order the renewal of hostilities by an attack on Communist forces in or north of the Demilitarized Zone, despite all the actions taken by the U.S. under paragraph 6 above, the U.S. should take the measures stated in Annex A (Annex A to NSC 170/1 amended as reported by NSC Action No. 1340, and circulated only to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence)."

Para. 8. "If ROK forces should renew hostilities unilaterally, the U.S. should, in addition to appropriate actions under Annex A:

- a. Stop all economic and military assistance to Korea.
- b. Discontinue all logistic or other support to the ROK forces.
- c. Take such other military measures as seem feasible and consistent with the security and capability of UN forces to block ROK offensive action.
- d. Evacuate UN civilians.
- e. Notify the Communists that the UN Command will disassociate itself from the ROK action, but will defend UN Command forces against any Communist attack, and will

Primary Responsibility: To be reported separately.

Operations Planned:
To be reported separately.

Primary Responsibility: State, Defense, FOA

Operations Planned:
By Defense-FOA-State
1. Act immediately to take the steps outlined in this paragraph. Target date: Contingent.

By Defense
1. Prepare to take such other actions (paragraph 8c above) as are necessary. Target date: Contingent.

By State
1. Seek the support of the other members of the UN Command, and notify the UN of the steps taken by the UN



"be prepared, if a Communist counterattack against the ROK threatens the security of UN Command forces, to undertake such military action as may be necessary for the security of UN Command forces."

f. Renew hostilities with the Communists only if necessary to protect the security of UN Command forces.

g. Promptly seek to obtain the support of the other members of the UN Command and, as appropriate, inform the UN of the actions taken by the UN Command under UN authority to prevent or limit hostilities."

Para. 9. "If Communist forces renew hostilities in Korea, the U.S. should:

a. Implement the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty.

b. Invoke the Joint Policy Declaration* by calling upon the signatories to carry out the commitment that 'if there is a renewal of the armed attack, challenging again the principles of the United Nations, we should again be united and prompt to resist. The consequences of such a breach of the armistice would be so grave that, in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea.'

c. Make clear to the world the necessity of expanding the war to China by air and naval action as the only feasible way of honoring our collective security commitments to the UN and our security commitments to the ROK.

d. Implement the military and diplomatic measures referred to in NSC Action No. 1004,

Command to prevent or limit hostilities. Target date: Contingent.

Primary Responsibility: State, Defense, USIA, ODM

Operations Planned:

By State-Defense

1. Prepare appropriate recommendations for the President to send to the Congress. Target date: Contingent.

By State

1. Invoke the Joint Policy Declaration by calling upon the signatories to carry out their commitment. Target date: Contingent.

2. State will table appropriate resolutions in the UN designed to justify and to enlist support for the UN Command counteraction. Target date: Contingent.

By State-Defense-USIA

1. If decided that the hostilities cannot be limited to the Korean

* Signed July 27, 1953.



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"January 8, 1954.*

e. Call on other UN members for effective military assistance appropriate to the expanded war against China."

peninsula, State, Defense, and USIA will prepare and conduct a program of publicity for public information demonstrating the necessity of expanding the war. Target date: Contingent.

By Defense-State-OEM

Implement the action called for in NSC Action No. 1004. Target date: Contingent.

Para. 10. "Pending a political settlement and in the absence of a renewal of hostilities, and conditioned upon satisfactory cooperation by the ROK in carrying out its agreements with the U.S., the U.S. should:"

Primary Responsibility: State, Defense
FOA

Operations Planned:

Keep under constant assessment the degree and manner in which the ROK cooperates by carrying out its agreements with the U.S. Target date: Continuing.

"a. Accept the division of Korea on the present demarcation line while seeking a satisfactory solution of the Korean problem by the use of other than military action.

cf. paragraph 11 below.

b. Continue to develop the ROK as a military ally.

Primary Responsibility: State,
Defense, FOA

c. Maintain the general security position of the ROK by increasing the combat effectiveness of its active armed forces and developing an effective reserve in order to permit a reduction in the size of its active armed forces at an appropriate time."

Operations Planned:

By Defense

1. Continue to cultivate and retain the friendship toward and confidence of ROK military leaders in the U.S. Target date: Continuing.

2. Continue to provide training assistance with a view to increasing the effectiveness of the ROK forces. Target date: Continuing.

3. Restrict development of ROK forces to increasing the effectiveness

* See Annex C.



of existing action units and to development of an effective reserve. Target date: Continuing.

4. Prepare plans for a reduction in active ROK divisions in being as soon as the ten-division reserve is achieved; the goal of such a reduction shall be ten active divisions, backed by 20 reserve divisions, and the reduction shall go forward by substituting five reserve divisions for five active divisions per annum. Implement such plans only after a review of the current political and military factors involved. Target date: Contingent.

By Defense, State, FOA

1. In view of the adverse impact of military requirements on the economic situation, keep the size of the ROK active forces under constant review with the objective of reducing them as rapidly as the political and military situation permits. Target date: Continuing.

2. At every appropriate opportunity make efforts to persuade the ROK of the desirability of reducing its forces to a level which it could more nearly support and which would permit adequate pay and allowances, developing information on and giving urgent attention to:

a. In connection with 2 above, Defense should develop information on the diversion in Korea of ROK military supplies of U.S. origin to the civilian economy and to other areas.

b. In connection with 2 above, FOA should give urgent attention to bolstering those sectors of the Korean economy (woods, fuel, gasoline, etc.) in which the black marketing of the ROK Army fills a genuine economic need. Target date: Continuing.



"d. Seek to continue the military involvement and thus the political interest of other nations in Korea and to give greater force to the Joint Policy Declaration by persuading the other UN members to maintain at least minimum armed forces within the ROK in order to preserve the UN Command."

Primary Responsibility: State, Defense

Operations Planned:

By State-Defense

1. When approached by our Allies emphasize the importance of maintaining their forces without further reductions in strength in Korea. Target date: Contingent.

2. To underline the significance which the U.S. places in maintaining a portion of UN strength in Korea, the U.S. should not make further reduction in U.S. combat personnel without careful joint consideration by State and Defense of the political as well as military aspects of such measures. Target date: Continuing.

3. Make clear in public statements and in diplomatic conversations -- and avoid implications to the contrary -- that the U.S. desire that UN forces remain in Korea is in no way motivated by a policy of keeping an international strategic military reserve in nearby readiness for use in possible hostilities with Communist China. Target date: Continuing.

"e. Working in and through the organs of the UN where feasible, continue to strengthen the government and democratic institutions of the ROK.

Primary Responsibility: State, Defense
FOA

Operations Planned:

By State

f. Encourage the development of cooperative relations, mutual respect and participation in multilateral activities between the ROK and the other free nations of Asia as a means of lessening the dependence of the ROK upon the U.S. for political and moral support; endeavor to develop a community of interest between the ROK and Japan, and also with the Philippines and the Republic

1. Take steps to work out a satisfactory reduction in the representation of UNCURK in Korea by getting the agreement of UNCURK members to the establishment of a subcommittee of three (preferably Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand). Such efforts should be abandoned, however, if it appears they will result in a premature debate in the UN or a change in the composition of UNCURK less favorable



"of China through the offer of U.S. good offices to help resolve outstanding problems and by encouragement of joint cooperation; and encourage the conditions necessary to form as soon as possible, and then participate in, a Western Pacific collective defense arrangement, including the Philippines, Japan, the Republic of China, and the ROK, eventually linked with the Manila Pact and ANZUS."

to the U.S. Target date: Immediate.

2. Encourage appropriate representations by the UNCURK sub-committee where such representation might help alter ROK behavior so as to (a) strengthen the ROK Government, (b) enhance, or prevent deterioration of, ROK international prestige, or (c) achieve other U.S. objectives. Target date: Continuing.

3. Conversely, discourage or seek to modify UNCURK activities or representations which may have the effect of weakening the ROK Government; reducing its international prestige; or militate against particular U.S. objectives. Target date: Continuing.

4. Encourage ROK participation in as many of the specialized agencies of the UN as possible and ROK attendance at international conferences. Target date: Continuing.

5. U.S. and foreign democratic institutions should be encouraged to support comparable institutions in the ROK but this should be done with a view to avoiding efforts which the ROK Government would resist as threat to its stability, resent to the point of active resistance, and which would create resentment against the ROK in the outside benevolent institution. Target date: Continuing.

6. Encourage the ROK and other free nations to exchange diplomatic missions. Target date: Continuing. (State)

6.

By State-Defense (See page 13.)

1. In view of relative ROK responsiveness to American press opinion, State and Defense should encourage unattributed press stories where these may appear to be helpful on placing indirect pressure on the ROK to conform to a greater degree of democratic practices (a case in point which might have been so handled was the suspension of the important newspaper Tong-a-Ilbo). Target date: As appropriate.



By USIA, FOA and others as appropriate

1. Direct U.S. material and financial support of ROK democratic institutions such as politically independent newspapers and educational institutions should be continued by USIA, FOA, and other agencies concerned, but only in cases where it is reasonably certain that such support will not ultimately weaken the ROK Government or because of the resentment of that Government of the adverse effect on the institutions being so supported. Target date: Continuing.

USIA- 2. Explain to other free countries the logic and basis of Korean national attitudes, while avoiding the appearance of serving as an apologist for the ROK. Target date: Continuing.

By State-Defense-USIA and others

1. (See page 12. By State-Defense)

2. Public information output designed to strengthen the ROK Government or ROK democratic institutions should avoid providing the Communists with testimony to the shortcomings of the ROK. Target date: Continuing.

By State-Defense-FOA

1. Refrain from active encouragement of a ROK-Japanese conference until the possibilities for improvement in ROK-Japanese relations becomes substantially greater than at present; maintain a position of willingness to make U.S. good offices available, making clear whenever appropriate that this cannot be done until there are reasonably good prospects of success. Target date: Continuing.

"g. Continue to strengthen the ROK economy by implementing the present expanded program of economic assistance in that portion of Korea controlled by the

Primary Responsibility: FOA, State, Defense

Operations Planned:



"ROK and the UN Command. The program should be designed:

- (1) To establish living standards approximating the 1949-50 levels, which the ROK should be able to support with a minimum of future external aid.
- (2) To increase the investment component as rapidly as is consistent with economic stability, placing greatest emphasis on projects contributing most immediately to increased productivity.
- (3) To permit the ROK to assume an increasingly greater proportion of the cost of supporting its armed forces.

By FOA

1. As it is probable that the objective of a 1949 standard of living has been accomplished, further increases should be avoided, insofar as possible without jeopardizing other essential U.S. objectives. (Further increases in the standard of living will make more difficult the problem of eventual ROK self-support.) Target date: Immediate.

2. Substantial price increases in the ROK economy are inevitable at this time. While there is no way of forecasting with any degree of accuracy the point at which inflation becomes unmanageable, the great and urgent need for developing ROK capacity to assist in its support necessitates carrying out the investment program to the maximum extent possible without provoking an inflation which will in itself result in a reduced total investment. Target date:

3. With its successor, ICA, should make every effort to assure the rapid and effective absorption of aid goods by the economy. Target date: Continuing.

By State-FOA-AEC

1. Examine the possibility of programming for Korea an atomic energy reactor. Target date: Immediate.

Primary Responsibility: State, Defense

Operations Planned:

By State

1. U.S. dedication to the attainment of a unified Korea by peaceful means should be reaffirmed from time to time by U.S. official spokesmen. Target date: As appropriate.

Para. 11. "In order to achieve a unified Korea under an independent and representative Government friendly toward the U.S., established through the holding of genuinely free elections under UN supervision for representation in the National Assembly, in which representation shall be in direct proportion to the indigenous population in



"Korea, the U.S. should be prepared to:

a. Engage in political negotiations between the Communists and the UN side (with the ROK associated with the latter), if it appears such negotiations would be productive.

b. Conclude arrangements with the Communists and such other nations as are concerned to guarantee the political and territorial integrity of a unified Korea.

c. Accept a level of Korean armed forces sufficient for internal security and capable of strong resistance in event of attack by a foreign power.

d. Forego all rights granted to the U.S. under the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, and to refrain from stationing U.S. forces and maintaining U.S. bases in Korea, provided no other foreign forces are granted these rights or maintain such forces and bases."

Para. 12. "Any such agreement should not preclude the provision of U.S. economic and military assistance to Korea."

Para. 13. "Pending achievement of satisfactory agreements with the Communists:

a. Continue in effect all pertinent instructions to the UN Command involving the maintenance of the security of the U.S. forces in the Korean area.

b. Continue diplomatic efforts to persuade our Allies to accept U.S. courses of action with respect to Korea and to contribute to their support.

c. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

2. In relations with our UN Allies, continue to make clear our insistence on, and seek support for, the position set forth in the Declaration of the Sixteen at Geneva as the basis for any further negotiations with the Communists on the question of Korean unification. Target date: Continuing.

3. At every appropriate opportunity, the legitimacy and independence of the ROK as compared to the puppet regime in North Korea should be stressed by U.S. spokesmen and through information outlets. Target date: Continuing.

4. Continue to emphasize to the ROK the desirability and eventual feasibility of peaceful solutions to Korean problems. Target date: Continuing.

By State-Defense

1. Avoid actions which would give the Armistice Agreement and the Demarcation Line the appearance of permanent political arrangements. Target date: Continuing.

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III. ACTIONS AGREED UPON AS DESIRABLE BUT WHICH REQUIRE FURTHER
FURTHER DECISION, STUDY OR AUTHORITY



IV. ACTIONS NOT AGREED UPON