

~~TOP SECRET~~MR. SPRAGUE'S OBSERVATIONS ON AGENCY COMMENTS
WITH RESPECT TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE KILLIAN REPORTGeneral Recommendations

3. (p. A19): Defense didn't really respond to the Panel recommendation. Mr. Sprague agreed that the problem of reducing the ground vulnerability of SAC was a complex one and that considerations of the sort mentioned in the Defense comment did have to be balanced.

7.a (p. A2): The Panel was concerned about the fact that we did not have a definite advance commitment which would permit us to use atomic warheads over Canada. We are not going to have time to get such authority in the event of an attack. Although the arrangement proposed is not as definite as what the Panel desired, it will suffice if we can assume that in the event of an actual attack we would be able to go ahead and use nuclear warheads without further authority.

7. b and c (p. A2): Implementation of these proposals was considered very important by the Panel to prevent an end-run around our warning systems. Extension of the DEW line and installation of the Lofar line both require negotiations with the Danes who present the most difficult problem. The State comment indicates that there would be difficulty with Iceland if there are requirements for use of substantial additional areas or for the stationing of personnel substantially over the current ceiling. State indicated privately to Mr. Sprague that Defense desires a very extensive increase in the number of personnel (perhaps from 1500 to 5000, plus dependents) and also desires a substantial quantity of flat farm land. It is questionable whether Defense has formulated these requirements on the basis of its minimum needs. It may be difficult to make these operations, particularly the Lofar operation which is highly classified, a joint operation as suggested by the Panel (Recommendation B-11b) and endorsed by State. (Mr. Lay suggested that perhaps these could be made NATO operations with the U.S. serving as the executive agent of NATO.) (See also Defense comment below on related recommendation, B-8b.)

8. (p. A19): The Panel felt that better relations between Canada and the U.S. were possible and essential in order to insure effective continental defense. The ideal thing would be an integrated command. Mr. Sprague said that relationships were evolving in a satisfactory direction and that he had no observation to offer on the Defense comment.

9. (pp. A3-A5): Mr. Sprague has no objection to the positions taken on international legal questions relating to the "three-mile limit" and freedom of space.

10. (based on advanced copy of ODM comments): The Panel was concerned about the fact that there was no central place for reporting and evaluating information with respect to the condition of our overseas communications systems. Thus, a significant part of our overseas communications could be cut by the Russians and, since no one had the

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whole picture, the significance of the fact would not be realized. Mr. Sprague has no feeling as to whether Defense or ODM was the agency to do the job, but a single central point was required.

Note: Mr. Sprague was directing his attention to only one aspect of the organizational recommendation, which is much broader in scope. It is probably because of the breadth of scope that there are differences between Defense and ODM on this matter. Such differences have existed in the past.7

Specific Recommendations

B-1 (p. A23): This suggestion for raising the northern terminus of the Atlantic extension of the North Canada line from Newfoundland to Greenland would provide double the warning time (from one to two hours) to the northeast U.S. and Washington, which contain the most populous areas in the country. It is therefore a matter of considerable policy significance.

B-4b (p. A24): Defense misunderstood this recommendation. With a manual system there is a limit to the number of radars that can be in use at one time because of the limited capacity of the system to handle the data produced. Thus, the radars must be of a type that have a relatively broad geographical range and a relatively low altitude coverage. A semiautomatic computer system, such as the SAGE system, will permit the use of many more radars and thus make it possible to use radars of a more limited geographical range but higher altitude coverage. The Defense comment seems concerned only with the problem of technical compatibility between the radars and the SAGE system.

B-5 (p. A27): The problem to which this recommendation was addressed is the three-service problem as it related to continental defense. It is very important in the case of continental defense where coordination is essential. The problem is not entirely a command problem but a problem of ensuring that equipment designed and procured by the different services is compatible. For example, communications equipment used by the different services in AEW aircraft is sometimes incompatible so that it is impossible for aircraft from the different services patrolling in the same general area to communicate with each other.

B-8a (p. A28): In considering this negative comment of Defense, it is necessary to look at the concept underlying the Panel's recommendations. This recommendation looks toward the establishment of a new "action" line by the addition of overwater segments, in the Atlantic and the Pacific, to the planned mid-Canada line. With this arrangement, when enemy aircraft crossed the present warning line, action could be taken to get U.S. forces in a readiness condition, e.g. SAC pilots could be called to their bases and their aircraft warmed up; but action to put SAC in the air would be taken when the new "action" line was crossed. This proposal takes account of the increased speed of Russian planes; with jet bombers we will have only half the warning time.

B-8b (pp. A28 and 23): The Panel felt that even before it was possible to build the whole of the proposed seaward extension of the North

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Canada warning line through Greenland, Iceland and the Faroes, it would be very useful and relatively inexpensive to install the ground-based radar for this line. Such radars by themselves would give satisfactory cover except at low altitudes between the stations, and would thus provide, at an early date, a preliminary distant early warning line. Defense has ignored this aspect of the recommendation which is contained in the last part of B-8b.

B-8c (p. A29): Defense has misunderstood the recommendation. The Panel indicated in Specific Recommendation B-1 that it did not want the installation of the presently planned line delayed for geographical refinements. Rather, they would like to see the line built first, as planned, to Hawaii and then moved as suggested. Once the airborne and seaborne equipment is available it can be readily moved to another location. Mr. Sprague doubted whether, as stated by Defense, it would be easier to end-run such a line.

B-10 (p. A31): The Defense comment is based on a complete misunderstanding of the Panel recommendation. High altitude performance is wanted by the Panel. The difficulty is that present interceptors were not developed as high level interceptors, but as dog-fighters. The problem of developing an interceptor for continental defense is quite different. The weight of existing interceptors limits their altitude. Since the missile itself will now have the maneuverability necessary, the interceptor does not any longer need to be designed to withstand the stresses for which it is presently designed, but only to reach high altitudes quickly. We need to design a real interceptor with a good horsepower-to-weight ratio and also to retrain pilots so they can fly such aircraft without pulling off their wings.

Note: It is not clear to me that Defense misunderstood the recommendation. What Defense seems to say is that air-to-air missiles are not now effective enough to justify changing immediately to an interceptor which would rely wholly upon the missile for maneuverability. Rather, Defense suggests, the change should be "evolutionary". Does Mr. Sprague argue with Defense's statement with respect to the present effectiveness of the air-to-air missile?]

B-11a (pp. A31-32): The Panel realized that a harbor attack can only be a part of any general attack since it would not be possible to hit our SAC bases through such an attack. Mr. Sprague had nothing to say about Defense comments.

C-1 (p. A34): Planning Board discussion of the continental defense progress reports suggests that, contrary to the comment of Defense, military planning is relying on some strategic warning.

C-9 (pp. A46-47): CIA says that it is using every known type of information retrieval equipment. The Panel thought, however, that they were not making use of everything available. Since the experts on the Panel are now to be consultants to CIA, presumably any additional possibilities will be fully explored.



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